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Are married couples more credit constrained than unmarried households? If the cost of sepa-
ration increases the risk of default, banks might be willing to lend to stable couples. In presence of
incomplete information, marriage could be used as a signal of the quality of the match. This paper
investigates the link between marriage and credit constraints. I use matching methods to evaluate
the impact of marriage on credit constraints. I ﬁnd that married couples are more likely to be
approved for their loan, but they bear higher costs of credit. The diﬀerences between married and
unmarried couples can be attributed to selection in the marriage rather than to discrimination
against unmarried couples.
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Encouraging access to property has been at the heart of political debates in France for the last
decades. There are two main reasons keeping households away from ownership: households may not
be willing to be owner or households may not be able to become owner. Political measures target the
latter, providing state-supported loans (such as Prêt aidé à l’accession à la propriété (PAP) and a
Prêt conventionné since 1977, a zero interest loan Prêt à taux zéro since 1995). Such measures clearly
aim at making credit constraints less binding, by decreasing the cost of credit. It supports the idea
that households are renters not because they chose it, but because they are not able to become owner.
Since the seminal work by Hall (1978), the literature has broadly investigated the idea that at least
some households are credit constrained in the economy. This empirical question has important theo-
retical consequences: if households are credit constrained, they can not smooth their consumption over
the life cycle, leading to a non optimal consumption path. It challenges the permanent income cycle
hypothesis (PIH) and then the Ricardian equivalence which implies that macroeconomic stabilization
policies are not eﬀective.
Why are households credit constrained? Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) indicates that the lack of infor-
mation on which entrepreneurs are likely to default could explain credit rationing. Banks are likely
to discriminate among households those having a high probability to default. Because the bank does
not know which households are more likely to default then it has to use proxies such as income and
to impose a collateral. What can household do to make the constraints less binding? A strategy
inspired by the signalling literature would be to ﬁnd a signal that shows that the risk of default is
low. If the risk of default is correlated to the risk of separation of the couple, then marriage could be
used as a signal of the match quality and then lower credit constraints. The marriage is a good signal
of the stability of the couple if it permits to separate stable from unstable couples. As a consequence,
it has to be observable and costly. But the cost has to be higher for unstable couples. As marriage
represents an additional cost in case of separation, it could be more costly for unstable couples than
for stable couples. The idea of marriage as signal has not been investigated in the empirical literature
on marriage, although it has been proposed in the theoretical literature on marriage since Bishop
(1984). Other signal for the stability of the couple could be investigated, such as children or the
duration since the formation of the couple. However, children also represents a cost for both married
and unmarried couples, that could lower the chances to be approved for a credit and the duration
since the formation of the couple is not observed by the bank. Moreover, the inactivity of the woman
could be interpreted as a signal for the commitment of spouses and therefore for the stability of the









































1But it could be interesting to investigate these other characteristics can be interpreted as signal of
the stability of the couple.
This paper investigates the link between credit constraints and marriage. Identifying credit con-
strained households is challenging because credit constraints are not observed. Based on data from
the 2001 housing survey in France, I study two types of credit constraints inspired by the literature on
credit constraints. Using declarative credit constraints, I study constraints at the extensive margin:
are married couples more able to get a loan? Then I turn to the terms of the credit: are married
couples more able to get a better loan? The loan is described by 6 variables: value (expressed in
level or in annual income), downpayment (expressed in level and in proportion of the value of the
housing), total cost of the loan and required income. I cannot compare directly the outcomes of
married and unmarried couples, as they have diﬀerent observable and unobservable characteristics.
I use matching methods to deal with the diﬀerences in observables between married and unmarried
couples. The results do not exhibit stronger credit constraints for unmarried couples than for married
couples. However, unmarried couples are more discouraged borrowers than married couples. That
could be explained by selection in the marriage. On the contrary, married couples look disadvan-
taged on the credit market. This surprising result could be interpreted as a selection on unobservable
characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the existing theories of marriage contracts
and section 3 describes how credit constraints are measured in the literature. To my knowledge, these
two streams of the literature have never been jointly considered. Section 4 deﬁnes the data and the
measure of credit constraints. Section 5 explains the estimation strategy and section 6 presents the
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Marriage as a signal
When Becker wrote his seminal work on marriage (??), he made no diﬀerence between married and
unmarried couples. Following his path, marriage and household formation have been treated identi-
cally in models for decades. This can be explained by the fact that there were almost no cohabiting
couples in the 1970s. The last decades witnessed a change in household formation, with the in-
crease of cohabitation jointly with the increase in the age at the ﬁrst marriage. As explained by
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007), the increase in the number of cohabiting couples is led by two forces:
marriage tends to be preceded by a period of cohabitation for a large part of couples and cohabitation









































1to estimate the number of "permanent cohabitation". As a consequence, the number of cohabiting
couples in a cross section sample tends to become larger than what it was in the 1970s, especially
in Europe. Stevenson and Wolfers estimate that 10.8% of couples are cohabiting in France in 2003,
which is twice higher than in the US at the same period. The dramatic increase in the number of
cohabiting couples coincides with the increase of out-of-wedlock births in France. 37.2% of newborn
babies in 1994 had unmarried parents, 44.7% in 2001 and more than a half since 2006 (INSEE, 2010).
Therefore, marriage is not necessarily the stepping stone of the formation of the family in France.
This phenomenon raises many questions on the role of marriage in the couple’s life cycle. The
idea of marriage as the couple outset tends to disappear. The marriage analysis follows now a
choice-based approach. Couples can choose to get married or not, and when they get married.
Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006) propose a model in which cohabiting is a necessary step to observe
the quality of the couple in an uncertain environment. Matouschek and Rasul (2008) investigates
three reasons of getting married: marriage provides an exogenous beneﬁt, serves as a commitment
device, and it is used as a signal toward the partner. Their analysis of the impact of unilateral marriage
on divorce trends tends to support the commitment device hypothesis. It implies that marriage is
used in a repeated game to ensure that partners play cooperative strategies.
In an early paper, Bishop (1984) proposes an alternative analysis of marriage: marriage as a signal
towards the world. This analysis is also supported by Rowthorn (2002). The idea of marriage as a
signal is in the same vein as the theory of signal by Spence (1973). As divorce is costly, the marriage
can be viewed as a costly signal of the quality of the couple. The cost is not bear by the couple when
getting married (investing in the signal) but if the couple breaks up. Therefore, it can be viewed
as a signal of the quality of the couple as the (expected) cost of marriage is higher for poor quality
couples. Marriage is a signal toward the rest of the world, whereas the signalling theory of marriage
in Matouschek and Rasul suggests that marriage is a signal toward the other partner. But marriage
could provide information to economic agents for whom the quality of the match does matter such
as economic agents involved in a long term partnership with the couple. Indeed, in a context of
uncertainty, before starting a long term partnership with the couple or one of the spouses, the agent
could be willing to know if the partner/couple is reliable. Marriage could express the capacity to
commit in a long term relationship. For example, marriage could prove the capacity of a partner to
get involved, and impact her employability. Korenman and Neumark (1991) ﬁnds a wage gap between
married and unmarried men, and attribute the "marriage premium" to a selection in marriage.









































1the couple contracts a long term relationship with the bank or the mortgage broker (thereafter both
of them are called with the generic word "bank"). If the bank has to pay some costs at bargaining
a new loan in case of divorce, it is more likely to lend to stable couples. But stability is not directly
observable, thus the banker requires a proxy for stability: marriage could be a such a proxy, especially
as the duration since the couple formation is unobserved. In order to be a good signal, the marriage
needs to be observed, which is obviously the case, and costly. But the cost of marriage has to be high
enough to induce a separate equilibrium, i.e. stable couples get married and unstable couples do not.
So the cost of the marriage should be linked to the risk of splitting. If this assumption is veriﬁed, it
should avoid reverse causality. Indeed, if couples are aware that they are more likely to be approved
for their loan if they are married, even unstable couples could contract a marriage. Therefore, the
marriage induces a separate equilibrium if the cost of marriage is high enough to keep unstable couples
away from marriage, i.e. if the Individual Rationality constraint is veriﬁed, indicating that couples
reveal their type by getting married.
Of course, the bank is willing to discriminate couples based on their stability only if it is costly
to lend to unstable couples. The cost for the bank might arise if the couple breaks up. Several
reasons explain the cost of separation for the bank. First, a separation can be very costly, because of
moving cost, lawyers, etc. Therefore, agents can be economically weak during the period of divorce,
thus increasing the risk of default. The typology of households listed as having an excessive debt in
2001 by the Banque de France1 indicates that 27% of excessively indebted households are divorced
(or separated) whereas 6.5% of the population is divorced (Banque de France, 2002). Moreover, the
debt became excessive after a divorce for 16% of them, and for an accumulation of credits for 48%
of them. Therefore, even if the risk of default is low in France, it tends to increase after a divorce or
a separation. If the couple is economically weak before a separation, the separation could increase
the economic burden and then the risk of default. If the risk is large enough, the bank should favor
stable couples, and so married couples, if marriage is consider as a signal.
The French survey on households’ assets (Enquête Patrimoine 1998) provide information on which
households declare having experienced ﬁnancial problems during the past years. Table 1 shows that
the proportion of respondants indicating that they experienced some problems is much bigger among
households that split during the last years. Especially, 31.8% of respondant having broken up during
the last year declare having experience ﬁnancial problem during the last year, whereas only 8.4% of
unseparated couples and 12.2% of singles had such problem. Similarly, 29.7% of respondants having
1When they cannot support their debt anymore, households can call the Banque de France to have their debt paid oﬀ
by the Banque de France. They have then to pay oﬀ the Banque de France and they are listed as having an "excessive









































1broken up during the last 5 years declare having experienced ﬁnancial problem for several years.
Tables 2 points that among respondants experiencing a separation, previously married individuals tend
to experience more ﬁnancial problems than previously unmarried individuals. Among respondants
declaring that they experienced ﬁnancial problems, separated individuals tend to attribute more their
ﬁnancial problems to "personal reasons" (that includes separation) than other couples especially
among previously married couples. Although these descriptive statistics do not give clear results on
the causality of separation of ﬁnancial diﬃculties, they tend to support the idea that individuals are
ﬁnancially weak after a separation.
But, default is the worst case: the separation does not end up in default in most cases. Then,
the separation can also be costly even if the couple does not default. There are two classic cases.
First case, the couple sells the house when separating and pays oﬀ the debt, providing the housing
situation gives the opportunity to sell the house. The bank can charge the couple for the penalties
in that case2. It induces a cost (albeit low) for the bank in terms of time and bargaining when the
debt is liquidated. Second case, one spouse wants to buy her part from the other spouse and to stay
in the house. In that case, she has to renegotiate the credit with the bank and to contract a new one
to buy the other partner’s part. This induces some negotiation costs. In all cases, the bank could
support indirect costs after a separation with the loss of a consumer. Consumers tend to be reluctant
changing of bank, except when contracting a credit. As the housing credit are long term credits, they
can be used by the bank to attract new consumers. Therefore, the separation and the liquidation of
the credit increase the risk of loosing a consumer.
A marital-based discrimination is an important issue in a context of raising cohabitation. If couples
have to wait for being married in order to borrow, they would postpone the investment decision. It
makes it more diﬃcult to smooth consumption over the life cycle. They could also bring forward their
marriage. In an analysis of uncertain match quality à la Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006), it could
decrease the mean quality of married couples and then increase divorce rate on the long run. If the
bank needs a signal of the quality of the couple, then a decrease in the marriage rate could introduce
non optimality on the credit market.









































13 Measuring credit constraints
3.1 A general framework deﬁning credit constraints
The deﬁnition of credit constrained is straightforward: a household is constrained if it cannot borrow
as much as what would be optimal given its intertemporal utility. Therefore, its consumption path is
not the optimal over the life cycle, because it cannot borrow the amount of debt that maximizes its
intertemporal utility and smooth its consumption. So the determination of who is credit constrained
and how much she is constrained requires the observation of how much the couple is willing to
borrow. The optimal consumption path is determined by an intertemporal program of consumption.
The model is deﬁned in the classical life cycle permanent income model. However, this framework
has been challenged since the pioneer papers by Hall (1978) and Hall and Mishkin (1982). They show
that the Euler equations derived from the intertemporal model induced by the permanent income
hypothesis are violated, supporting the idea that household are credit constrained. Euler equations
simply states that the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption is set
equal to the marginal rate of transformation, ie how much 1 unit of current money produces in the
future.
There are several implications to Hall’s ﬁnding. First it challenges the permanent income cy-
cle hypothesis (PIH) traduces the Ricardian equivalence, implying that macroeconomic stabilization
policies are not eﬀective with PIH. But this hypothesis requires that households are able to smooth
their consumption over the life cycle. As explained by Hayashi (1985a), the life cycle permanent
income hypothesis need household to be unconstrained. Therefore, if at least some households are
credit constrained, macroeconomic stabilization policies could be eﬀective. So, if households are not
equally subject to credit constraints, it could be eﬃcient to make policies targeting credit constrained
households. Challenging the PIH has been an important motivation in the literature. Then, credit
constraints can also impact the housing market. If they are constrained, households cannot move
easily and thus, they can not adjust their housing stock to their need. Gobillon and Le Blanc (2002)
show that investment in housing is similar to the (s,S) as in classic investment models. Credit con-
straints decrease mobility on the housing market, inducing market frictions.
The idea of the paper is to explore if unmarried couples are more credit constrained than married
couples. Diﬀerences in the access to credit between households imply a diﬀerence between households
on the long run. If credit constraints are more stringent for unmarried households, then the impact









































1introduces diﬀerences that could impact their saving and investment behavior on the long run. As a
consequence, the rise of cohabitation could increase the diﬀerences between households and impact
wealth accumulation during the life cycle.
My measure of credit constraints is inspired by Hayashi (1985b), deﬁning credit constraints as (i)
credit rationing, ie they are constrained on quantities: "they face some quantity constraint on the
amount of borrowing" (ii) total cost of the loan is too high: "the loan rate available to them is higher
than the rate at which they could borrow"
3.2 Identifying credit constrained households
Following the seminal paper by Hall (1978), Hall and Mishkin (1982) uses Euler equations to study
how the consumption is related to the permanent income (using the panel data of the PSID3) and
transitory shocks on income. They ﬁnd that consumption is more volatile than income: 80% of con-
sumption obeys the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis, while 20% of consumption is explained
by transitory shocks on income. They attribute these 20% to credit constraints. However, they are
not able to identify credit constrained households. Identifying who is credit constrained and the im-
pact of credit constraints is diﬃcult because it relies on an unobserved information: the expectation
the household forms on its permanent income. As they are not observed, credit constraints have to
be derived from proxies.
Proxies are given either by indirect criteria such as income and net-wealth of the household or
directly from declarative self reported indicators of constraints. Linneman and Wachter (1989) de-
rived credit constraints from the observation of wealth and the income which deﬁnes the maximum
home purchase price the household can aﬀord. This amount is compared to the actual value of the
housing purchased by the household. If it is close to the maximal price the household can aﬀord,
then the household is said to be credit constraint. If not, it is said to be unconstrained. Using
their deﬁnition of credit constraint, Linneman and Wachter ﬁnd that 27% (resp. 15.5%) of house-
hold are credit constrained during the 1975-1977 (resp. 1981-1983) period in the United States.
Hayashi (1985a) imposes the condition that the debt held by the household cannot exceed the value
of assets that serves as a collateral. If it is, then the household is credit constrained. In an inﬂuen-
tial paper, Zeldes (1989) splits his sample into low assets and high assets households, arguing that
households with large amount of wealth and large wealth-to-income ratio are not credit constrained.
On the contrary, Jappelli (1990), Cox and Jappelli (1993), Duca and Rosenthal (1994) on US data,









































1or Chivakul and Chen (2008) on data from Bosnia and Herzegovina consider as credit constrained
households reporting they made a request for credit that was turned down. Wakabayashi and Horioka
(2005) uses Japanese data on complaints against ﬁnancial institutions to derive credit constrained
households, and Gross and Souleles (2001) exploit data on credit card accounts and use changes in
the credit limit and in interest rates to estimate dynamic eﬀects of changes in credit on consumption,
denoting binding credit constraints.
Identifying credit constrained households serves several purposes. The ﬁrst purpose was to de-
ﬁne if at least some households are credit constrained and how much households in the economy
it represents. Hayashi (1985a) and Zeldes (1989) test if the Euler equation is likely to be violated
for household likely to be constrained and not for the unconstrained household. Their consumption
behavior tends to support the idea that at least some households are credit constrained. Jappelli
(1990) uses declarative information on US data to proxy borrowing constraints. He deﬁned as credit
constrained a household whose request was turned down or not fully granted, or if the household
did not apply to a credit because it thought that it could be turned down. He ﬁnds that 19% of
the households are credit constrained. Using a similar proxy, Chivakul and Chen (2008) shows that
around 80% of households are credit constrained in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2001. The second
purpose focuses on the impact of credit constraints on economic choices, such as access to ownership.
Using US data, Linneman and Wachter (1989) and Duca and Rosenthal (1994) study the impact of
borrowing constraints on access to owner occupied housing. Using diﬀerent proxies identifying con-
strained households, both ﬁnd high and signiﬁcant impact of credit constrained on home ownership.
Cox and Jappelli (1993) estimates the extra amount constrained households would like to borrow.
They identify constrained households from replies to direct questions. They are able to model the
desired amount of debt from the unconstrained group and extrapolate the result to estimate the extra
amount of debt desired by constrained household. They ﬁnd that highly constrained household would
increase their liabilities by 75%. Grant (2003) jointly model supply and demand for credit using a
canonical desequilibrium model. He estimates that 26-31% of households are credit constrained and
would like to borrow up to 4,000 dollars more.
The goal of the paper is to estimate if unmarried and married couples face diﬀerent credit con-
straints. Therefore, I use the classic Rubin framework of evaluation literature in econometrics. I
consider marriage as a treatment and I analyze the impact of marriage on credit constraints using
econometric tools of the evaluation literature. However, as for papers that study the impact of credit









































1by the literature to derive credit constraints. To derive constraints at the extensive margin, I use
declarative responses to questions on rejected application as in Jappelli (1990). To proxy constraints
at the intensive margin, I compare the maximum debt a household can aﬀord to the actual debt held
by the household, as in Linneman and Wachter (1989). If they are close, I consider that the household
is constrained : therefore the amount of debt observed gives the supply side of the loan, because it
gives what constrained households were able to get. Among constrained households, I compare how
married and unmarried couples perform on the credit market. As this part only consider constrained
households, the sample size is drastically reduced.
4 Descriptive statistics
4.1 Data: Housing Survey
4.1.1 The survey
The housing survey (Enquête Logement) is a national survey conducted by the INSEE4 describing
the housing stock in France. It is a cross section survey, repeated almost every 4 years since 1970.
Information about credit constraints is available in 2001, therefore I use only one cross section of
the survey5. It provides detailed information on housing characteristics together with a number of
household characteristics such as housing status, income, and demographic features. New owners are
also surveyed about their debts when they had to contract a loan for their investment. Only debts
contracted for housing investment are described.
Macroeconomic forces drive the credit market, especially the interest rate and the housing price.
The interest rate for long term housing loans can be approximate by the rate of national bonds (see
ﬁgure 1). The 1997-2001 period witnessed a decrease in the long-term interest rate and an increase
in the housing prices everywhere in France. In 2001, the credit market tends to be favorable to
investment: the leading interest rate decreases and the monetary aggregate M3 increases, meaning
that banks are likely to lend to economic agents. In this context, credit constraints tend to be less
binding at the end of the studied period than at the beginning.
4Institut National de Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques www.insee.fr
5Other surveys provide information on debts, such as the survey on assets (Enquête Patrimoine) which is a national
survey providing detailed information on households’ assets, including debts and housing. The 1998 wave also surveys
households on their credit constraints, but only during the last 2 years. I preferred working on the housing survey because
the sample is 3 times larger and because the main interesting question for this paper focuses on credit constraints on
a larger span (5 years) than the survey on assets (2 years), which increases the size of my subsample of interest. Panel










































The sample of the housing survey is representative of the French population. I select a subsample to
address the issue of credit constraints on couples. Among the 32,156 households of the initial sample,
I keep 2,398 households (or 2,315 with the strict deﬁnition of credit constraints - see below for the
deﬁnitions). The subsample is selected step by step in order to focus on access to owner-occupied
housing. First, I keep couples. In order to make sure that the application for a credit was not
made by one spouse with another partner, I exclude couples such that one spouse was committed
in an other couple 5 years ago. As I want to analyze access to owner occupied housing, I drop all
owner couples that don’t buy for the ﬁrst time. Among the remaining sample, 40% rent and 60% are
owner. But among renters, some have been credit constrained and other have not. The question on
declarative credit constraints permits identifying credit constrained households among renters, during
the last 5 years. Therefore I can study households that have been willing to invest in housing during
the last 5 years: either they succeed then I identify them because they have a mortgage contracted
less than 5 years ago or they failed and they say their application has been turned down. I can also
identify discouraged borrowers who declare willing to invest but do not apply for a mortgage, thinking
their application could be turned down. So I only keep households that have been willing to invest
during the period 1997-2001 (have they fulﬁlled or not). There are a strict and a broad deﬁnition of
being constrained. The strict deﬁnition only includes households whose application had been turned
down. The broad deﬁnition adds discouraged borrowers. In my sample, 1,212 households are recent
owners, 1,001 did not invest but were not constrained and 102 households (resp. 185) are constrained
according to the strict (resp. broad) deﬁnition of credit constraints. I want to avoid couples with
unknown collateral value. So I drop couples owner of other housing, because the value of the other
housing is not surveyed. As I only observe mortgage, I do not know if the household holds other debts.
In order to reduce the risk of measurement error, I drop households with at least one self-employed
partner because they are more likely to hold professional debts, and because housing could also be
used as a work place. The type of marital contract is likely to be relevant if the female is active.
Indeed, if she is inactive, then the debt only relies on the male’s income are they eventually getting
divorced or not. So I drop couples with an inactive woman. Eventually, for matching reasons, I had
to drop couples if the male does not work full time, high income household (more than 12,000 euros
a month) and people such that the head of the household is older than 50. The sample selection
process is described in table 3.
This subsample is very small compared to the whole sample, as it only represents 7.5% (7.2% for









































1French population. Indeed, the INSEE (2011) states that in 2000, 21.1% of households in France
was refunding a loan. But this includes singles: in 1999, 58.8% of the population lives in couples.
Moreover, keeping couples that have been willing to invest in housing once in the last ﬁve years
reduces dramatically the sample size.
4.2 Credit constraints
Credit constraints can have two impacts on investment behavior of couples:
• at the extensive margin: couples do not borrow at all, either because what they can borrow is
not enough to satisfy them or because the bank rejects their request
• at the intensive margin: couples borrow less than what they would like, because the price is too
high or they are constrained on quantities
4.2.1 Declarative credit constraints (at the extensive margin)
Estimating the impact of marriage on credit constraints at the extensive margin requires the obser-
vation of rejected loan applications.
Credit constraints at the extensive margin are diﬃcult to identify because one needs to distinguish
among non borrowers those who actually applied for a loan and were rejected from those who did
not. Figure 2 summarizes the application process. Couple may or may not want to invest in housing,
but this is not directly observed in the data. This information can be derived from the observation
of couples that declare having applied for a mortgage or having been discouraged. 60% of unmarried
couples and 69% of married couples are willing to invest in housing. Most couples need to borrow at
least part of the value of the housing: on the period 1997-2001, I do not observe any credits for only
4% of ﬁrst owner couples, including both non response to the debt questionnaire and those who could
aﬀord their investment without borrowing. So application for a loan is considered as a necessary step of
the investment. I refer as discouraged borrowers those couples that, while willing to invest in housing,
don’t apply because they think their loan could be rejected. Discouraged borrowers are answering
"Yes" to the question "Was there any time in the past 5 years that you (or your husband/wife) thought
applying for a credit at a particular place but changed your mind because you thought you might be
turned down?"6 The proportion of discouraged households is a bit higher for unmarried couples:
6Translation for: "Au cours des 5 dernières années, y a-t-il eu un moment où vous/votre conjoint avez envisagé de










































14% of them are identiﬁed as discouraged while 3.1% of married couples are discouraged borrowers.
Among those applying for a credit, rejected applications can be identiﬁed. Constrained borrowers are
those answering "Yes, rejected" to the question "Was there any time in the past 5 years that you were
rejected for a loan by a mortgage broker or a bank, or you were approved for a lower amount than
what you asked?"7 The rejection rate (5.2%) is a bit higher among unmarried couples than among
married couples (4.0%).
Credit constraints can be strictly deﬁned as credit constraints directly induced by the mortgage
broker, excluding the discouraged borrowers. Following Jappelli (1990), a broader deﬁnition of credit
constraints includes direct rejected applicants and discouraged borrowers. Using this broad deﬁni-
tion, 9.0% (resp. 7.0%) of unmarried (resp. married) couples are constrained. The strict deﬁnition is
more appropriate to the goal of the paper, which is to estimate the direct impact of being married.
However, as discouragement is indirectly bank-induced, the impact of marriage using the broader
deﬁnition is also estimated.
Constrained and unconstrained couples are described in table 5. Whatever the deﬁnition of
credit constraint, unconstrained couples tend to be richer, to work full time, to be more educated
and the spouses more often work in the public sector than constrained couples. The diﬀerences are
straightforward since the bank is more likely to approve the application of wealthier couples, who
tend to work more and to be more educated because education increases income in the life cycle.
Moreover, public employment is more stable than private employment. This results are conﬁrmed by
the regression of the dummy for credit constraints on the covariates presented in table 7: richer and
educated households are less likely to be constrained, but hte sector of employment does not impact
credit constraints.
4.2.2 Deﬁning credit constraints at the intensive margin
Credit constraints at the intensive margin, i.e. how much couples can borrow compared to how much
they would like to borrow are not directly observed. Even if the amount of money borrowed by the
household is observed, this amount does not directly give how much the household is constrained.
Indeed, it reﬂects how much unconstrained couples demand and how much constrained couples were
given. Grant (2003) proposed to model the observed credit using a canonical desequilibrium model
as in Fair and Jaﬀee (1972). The market for credit is composed of a demand side and a supply side.
On the demand side, the household wants to borrow di. On the supply side, the bank agrees to lend
7Translation for "Dans les cinq dernières années, est ce qu’un organisme de prêt, une banque , vous a refusé une









































1si to this household. The observed credit yi is the minimum of them:
yi = di + ci(si − di) with ci = 1{si < di}
The estimation of such models requires excluded variables both for the supply and for the demand
for credit. However, estimating the impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin
does not require information on both sides of the market. It only requires the observation of how
much the bank is likely to lend to a married couple compared to an unmarried couples. This diﬀerence
could be studied if si were observed for married and unmarried couples. The supply side si might be
observed for couples for whom the credit constraint is likely to be binding. Therefore, I use a classic
splitting sample strategy in the literature, based on observed assets: I only examine households that
I consider being constrained because they indicate how much a constrained household is able to get,
so it indicates the terms of the loan for credit constrained household at the intensive margin.
When investing in housing, the household buys a house of value V , partly with its downpayment
D and the mortgage M, such that V = D + M.
As explained in Linneman and Wachter (1989) and Gobillon (2008), credit constraints stem from
a two-fold rule: on wealth and on income. First, households should have a downpayment D, which
is greater than a part a of the value of the house. So D ≥ aV . This constraint is binding if the
household can not borrow more than M
D = 1−a
a D.
Second, the annual mortgage payment cannot be higher than a part e of the income. e is called
the eﬀort rate. When borrowing at a rate r, for a N-year mortgage, the household yearly refunds
R = ˜ rM, with ˜ r = r
(1+r)N
(1+r)N−1
8. Denoting I the year income, this constraint imposes that R ≤ eI. It
is binding if the household can not borrow more than M
I = eI
˜ r . Taken together, the two constraints
imply that the maximum value a household can borrow is:







For each household, I compute the maximum amount it can borrow when the constraint on income
is binding. ˜ r is computed using the mean r observed for the year the loan is contracted and using as
N, the duration of the main loan (determined by the most important debt) hold by the household. e
is ﬁxed to an arbitrary value 0.3, which is the maximal eﬀort rate approved by state-supported loans.
8The condition to determine the annual mortgage payment is that the sum of annual payment should be equal to




t=0 (1 + r)
tR = (1 + r)
NM ⇔
(1+r)N−1










































1Linneman and Wachter (1989) ﬁx e to 0.28. Then I consider as likely credit constrained household
those whose debt is higher than 0.85M
I. I chose 0.85 in order to satisfy two constraints: I want
to keep couples likely to be credit constrained, but I need my subsample to be as great as possible.
According to that deﬁnition, 33% of married couples and 31% of unmarried couples are credit con-
strained.
Table 6 summarizes the credit held by households, depending on their marital status. Notice that
the number of indebted couples is lower than the number of unconstrained household detected before.
This could be explained if some couples apply and are approved for a loan but they do not invest.
Constrained households are more indebted than unconstrained household: they hold a higher debt
and the debt represents 3.84 years of annual income, for 2.66 years for unconstrained households.
The constraint on downpayment does not seem binding for all households: 22.2% of couples do not
report any downpayment when contracting their mortgage. The downpayment represents 13.9% of
the house value for constrained couples, but 21.4% for unconstrained couples. In France, the State
supports access to owner-occupied housing by proving zero-rate loans (Prêt à Taux Zéro, denoted
PTZ below). This loan is often considered as personal downpayment. It can be refund either directly
or once the main mortgage is refunded. As so, it is considered as shifting personal savings over time.
Including PTZ in downpayment decreases the proportion of couples without downpayment to 9.8%
for constrained couples and 15.6% for unconstrained couples. Then, downpayments represent 24.4%
of the housing value for constrained household and 26.3% for unconstrained households. The total
cost of the loan represents the ratio of what is refunded on the initial debt. The cost is approxi-
matively 1.5 and similar for constrained compared to unconstrained couples. By deﬁnition of credit
constrained, the eﬀort rate is much higher among constrained couples than unconstrained couples.
Therefore, constrained households tend to borrow more than unconstrained households, with lower
downpayment. But the cost of credit is similar for both types of couples. They contract more State
supported loans.
Table 4 describes constrained and unconstrained households at the intensive margin. Among
indebted households, constrained households are richer and are more educated, and females are less
likely to work part time than unconstrained households. The constrained spouses less often work in
the public sector. These results are conﬁrmed in the regression of the characteristics of the debt on
the households characteristics and the debts characteristics in the column (1) to (5) in the table 8









































1household and the debt. They are diﬀerent as the sets of characteristics are diﬀerent. Table 8 uses
discretized variables while table 9 uses continuous covariates.
The value of the debt is impacted positively by the income and the characteristics of the debt (col-
umn (1)). The cost of the debt is negatively impacted by the income, the percentage of downpayment
and the number of children, but positively by the amount of the debt and if the female works part
time. Men working in the public sector impact positively the cost, but women working in the public
sector impact negatively the cost (column (3)). The amount of downpayment is positively correlated
to a higher income and higher education of the women, but negatively by the number of children
(column (4)). The percentage of the value paid with the downpayment is positively correlated to
the amount of downpayment and to the number of children and negatively to the cost and to the
amount of the debt (column (5)). Therefore, a higher income is correlated to a higher debt, but also
to a higher downpayment. The higher the part of the value is explained by the downpayment, the
lower the debt is. The total cost of the debt tends to decrease with the amount of the debt, and as a
consequence with the percentage of downpayment.
4.3 Married and unmarried couples
Constraints at the extensive margin are measured on a diﬀerent subsample than constraints at the
intensive margin. Indeed, it includes all couples that are willing to invest in housing. Therefore, it
includes constrained couples that are not able to access ownership. But it also includes households
that eventually give up getting a loan or that have not contracted the loan to the date the survey is
made. Therefore, I deﬁne two samples depending if constraints at the extensive or at the intensive
margin are at stake.
Table 5 describes the characteristics of constrained and unconstrained households according to
the strict and the broad deﬁnition of credit constraints at the extensive margin, depending on their
marital status. Married couples tend to be older, richer, and have more kids than unmarried couples,
are they constrained or not. The unmarried female works more full time and has higher diploma
than her married counterpart. Among unconstrained couples, unmarried male are more educated
than married. These characteristics are conﬁrmed by columns (5) and (6) in table 7 that give the
regression of a dummy "married" on the household and the debt characteristics.
Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of constrained couples at the intensive margin, depending
on their marital status. Married couples tend to have similar income, be older and have more kids









































1educated than their married counterparts. This results are conﬁrmed by column (6) in tables 8 and 9.
It also denotes that married couples face higher costs of credit and are less indebted than unmarried
couples.
As presented by ﬁgure 2 and table 6, married and unmarried couples tend to have similar access to
mortgage although they have diﬀerent observable characteristics. These characteristics are likely to
impact credit constraints: income for obvious reasons, diploma impacting the permanent income and
kids representing a cost for the couple. The analysis of characteristics impacting credit constraints
in the above sections shows that married couples share characteristics that indeed impact credit
constraints: higher income, lower education and older female.
The issue is then to understand if being married directly impact credit constraints, compensating
diﬀerences in observable characteristics or if being married has no impact on credit constraints, as
descriptive statistics suggest. The next section corrects for selection on observables using matching
methods.
5 Estimation strategy
5.1 Roy-Rubin causal model
The goal is to estimate if married couples beneﬁt from a reward that makes them less credit constrained
than unmarried couples. The impact of marriage on credit constraints could be analyzed using the
classic Roy-Rubin causal model, considering marriage as a non random treatment. Let y1
i be a measure
of access to credit by a couple i when married, and y0
i the measure of access to credit if unmarried.
Let mi be a dummy that equals one if the couple is married. The impact of marriage on the access
to credit is simply given by y1
i − y0
i. A classic statement in this literature is that both y1
i and y0
i can
not be observed at the same time, preventing from identifying the impact of marriage. Indeed, it is





yi measures the access to credit. Therefore, when measuring credit constraints at the extensive
margin, yi is a dummy indicating if the application for a credit has been turned down by a mortgage
broker (or, using the broad deﬁnition: if the application was rejected or if the couple is a discouraged
borrower).









































1(1985b), credit constraints could be deﬁned as
(i) credit rationing, "they face some quantity constraint on the amount of borrowing", in which
case constrained couples would be able to borrow a lower amount even if they face the same
loan rate.
(ii) "the loan rate available to them is higher than the rate at which they could borrow", in which
case the total cost of holding a debt is higher for a ﬁxed amount of debt.
To these two measures, I also consider a third one:
(iii) the condition on the value of the required downpayment is made more binding for constrained
households, i.e. they need a higher downpayment (or the loan-to-value ratio must be lower) for
constrained couples, for the same mortgage.
The goal of the paper is to identify the impact of being married on the diﬀerent outcomes describing
credit constraints.
5.2 The statistical problem of selection on observables
Identiﬁcation and counterfactual Estimating the impact of marriage can be framed within the
potential outcome approach. The potential outcome y0
i (resp. y1
i) is not observed for a married
(resp. unmarried) couple. It makes it impossible to observe the individual eﬀect of the marriage.
Extremely strong assumptions are needed to infer individual eﬀect, because it depends on the joint
distribution of y1
i and y0
i . At the contrary, the average eﬀect of marriage could be derived under
less stringent assumptions. The average treatment eﬀect on married couples, E(y1 − y0|m = 1)
depends on the marginal distribution of the potential outcomes and not on the joint distribution.
But E(y1 − y0|m = 1) = E(y1|m = 1) − E(y0|m = 1) and E(y0|m = 1) can not be observed. The
main idea is to approximate the counterfactual in the data. I present below the 8 approximations for
the impact of credit constraints I have computed. (To make the discussion clearer, I identify each
approximation computed in the result part in italic.)
The idea of the approach consists in constructing a suitable comparison group. A natural proxy
for married couples is unmarried couples. The simplest estimator for the impact of marriage is thus










































1However, as explained in section 4.3, married and unmarried couples have diﬀerent observable
characteristics. This could be related to a life cycle description of the couple, explaining why married
couples tend to be older (and then wealthier) and have more kids. Therefore, the simple diﬀerence
estimator could attribute to the marriage an impact of covariates that are not equally distributed in
the two subpopulations.
Unconfoundness As a consequence, the approach consists in deﬁning a ﬁxed set of covariates
justifying the unconfoundedness hypothesis. As stated by Imbens and Wooldridge (2007), "uncon-
foundedness, a term coined by Rubin, refers to the case where (non parametrically) adjusting for
diﬀerences in a ﬁxed set of covariates removes biases in comparisons between treated and control
units, thus allowing for a causal interpretation of those adjusting diﬀerences". So it refers to the pos-
sibility to embody all the diﬀerence in terms of potential outcomes, between married and unmarried
in a ﬁxed set of covariates. Of course, a marriage is not a social neutral institution, it is hard to
believe that diﬀerences between married and unmarried couples could be cleaned up with a set of
observed variables. But in terms of potential outcomes, it means that the joint distribution of poten-
tial outcomes is independent from the marital status conditional on other relevant characteristics for
the bank, such as income or wealth. This assumption is more believable. It means that the banker,
having observed relevant characteristics such as age, employment status, income, etc. determines the
outcome for married and unmarried couples, without taking into account the unobserved reasons that
make the married couples diﬀerent from unmarried couples. This assumption does not hold if there
is an unobserved characteristic relevant for the banker and highly correlated to the marital status -
such as social background -, that are observed by the banker and not the econometrician.
The main idea of the identiﬁcation strategy relies on the assumption that a set of ﬁxed covariates
X is observed by the econometrician and justiﬁes the unconfoundedness assumption. This set of
variable is such that
(y0
i,y1
i ) ⊥ mi|Xi (1)
This equation traduces the "conditional independence assumption" (thereby named CIA) or ig-
norability assumption. This assumption is the cornerstone of the identiﬁcation. Indeed, under the




















































i |mi = 1,Xi) − E(y0





i |mi = 1,Xi) − E(y0
i |mi = 0,Xi)
￿
Similarly, the ATU = E(y1
i − y0
i|mi = 0) (average treatment on the untreated) can be identiﬁed.
Control regression approach Under the assumption that the impact of the treatment is ho-
mogenous in the population, the controlled regression (est 2.) identiﬁes the impact. Indeed, if
y0
i = α + βXi + ε and if the impact of marriage is supposed constant, then, yi can be written
yi = α+τmi+βXi +ε, assuming ε ⊥ Xi. This impact can be estimated by a simple OLS regression.
But the OLS regression gives a parametric form for the impact of marriage, and it does not take
into account the common support condition. Therefore, it extrapolates the impact of marriage on
units that are not likely to be married (or unmarried). This condition is commented below. The two
estimators proposed so far are classic in this literature, so I consider them as my baseline estimates.
Another approach addressing the question of the impact of a treatment in the literature is the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (est 3.). The idea is that the treatment do not have an impact per
se but through diﬀerent rewards of the same characteristics. So it proposes to disentangle in the
determination of the outcome what comes from a diﬀerence in the distribution of the covariates
(unmarried couples are younger) from a diﬀerence in the reward of the covariates (being 30 years old
does not impact credit constraints the same way when married or unmarried). Diﬀerent rewards of
the covariates are often considered as a source of discrimination. It supposes that:
y1
i = X1




i β0 + ε0
i






The ATT could be approximate by the "rewards" part of the equation, because it represents the
rewards of being married, keeping the characteristics constant.









































1and extrapolate the relationship between the yi and the mi and Xi outside the common support.
Common support and matching The common support assumption states that both treated and
untreated have to share common traits in order to estimate the impact of the treatment. The common
support assumption requires that for each combination of X (strictly deﬁned) there are married and
unmarried couples. Indeed, if some values of Xi are only observed for mi = 1 then the coeﬃcient
on mi could be biased because part of the impact of Xi on yi is captured by mi. This problem is
likely to bias the results if there is no variation in the marital status for some combination of the
Xi, e.g. if wealthiest or oldest couples are all married. Therefore, the impact of marriage should be
estimated on a subsample that provides variation in the treatment status for all combination of Xi.
This problem sheds light on which units among treated and controlled (i.e. married and unmarried)
should be compared. This implies adding an assumption of the joint distribution of the covariates
and the marital status, called the common support assumption, often written as9:
0 < Pr(mi = 1|Xi) < 1 (2)
Indeed, if Pr(mi = 1|Xi) = 1 I only observed some married couples for some combination of X.
On the common support, I can observe married and unmarried couples for each combination of X.
In order to estimate the ATT, the approach of matching consists in reweighting the untreated units
to make them similar to treated units. For the ATU, the approach consists in reweighting treated
unit to make them similar to untreated units. The number of married couples is more important than
unmarried couples. Therefore, the estimation of the outcome for treated units is likely to be more
precise than the estimation of the outcome for untreated units.
Then, the idea is to compare a simple diﬀerence between the average outcome for treated and
the weighted average outcome for untreated. There are diﬀerent ways to compute the weights. The
most intuitive way consists in a one to one matching of married couples to unmarried couples with
the same characteristics and to give them a unit weight (zero for unmatched). Notice that under a
strong deﬁnition of the ignorability assumption, this is suﬃsant to estimate the individual eﬀect of
marriage. Indeed:
9Only Pr(mi = 1|Xi) < 1 is necessary to identify the ATT and 0 < Pr(mi = 1|Xi) for the ATU. As I’m willing to











































i |mi = 1)
τ(x) = E(y1
i − y0
i |mi = 1,Xi = x)
= E(y1
i |Xi = x,mi = 1) − E(y0
i |Xi = x,mi = 0)
τ = E(τ(x))
However, this estimation is infeasible if the dimension of X is large - and the sample size is ﬁnite,
because it requires to observe both married and unmarried couples in each cell deﬁned by the X. It is
possible to use a metric that measure the distance between two combination of X. The Mahalanobis
metric (est. 4) matches units on a metric that measures the distance in terms of covariates between
a treated and an untreated unit. It permits choosing the closest match in the sense of that metrics.
Propensity score matching Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that it is not necessary to
condition on all covariates. Conditioning on the propensity score (i.e. p(x) = P(mi = 1|Xi = x)) is
suﬃcient to remove the biases due to observable covariates, and unobservable characteristics, if they
are perfectly correlated to observable characteristics. Therefore, the impact of the marriage can be
estimated by comparing the outcome between a married couple and a matched unmarried couple, i.e.
a couple having a similar values of the propensity score. The use of the propensity score makes the
matching rely on less stringent conditions than the one to one matching, but there is still a need of
common support of the propensity score: it means that each level of the propensity score is likely to
be observed among married and unmarried couples. So even if there are only married or unmarried
couples for some combination of X, there is enough overlap in the X to suppose that this combination
could be observed among the other group.
The propensity score matching estimator compares the mean outcome of married couples to the
mean outcome of matched counterfactuals. There are diﬀerent methods to match individuals. In
this paper I ﬁrst use the nearest neighbors matching (est. 5), that uses for each treated unit the
closest untreated units in terms of propensity score (ﬁve neighbors in this case). Then I use kernel
matching (est 6.) that for each treated unit mimics a counterfactual attributing diﬀerent weights to
each untreated observation.
Which matching estimator should be chosen? The choice has to be led by the eﬀectiveness in
eliminating the bias and eﬃciency considerations. If the true propensity score is known, all methods









































1economics), it has to be estimated (often using a logit or probit speciﬁcation) and the eﬃciency is
not clear. Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003) (thereafter call HIR) proposes an eﬃcient reweighted
estimator based on the propensity score.
Reweighting estimators The methods presented so far are all based on the same idea: reconstruct
for each treated unit a suitable comparison unit using untreated units. But as I am interested in
moments, I can also use the propensity score as weights in order to create a balanced sample of
married and unmarried observations, as suggested by HIR. The matching estimators presented above
try to mimic the counterfactual for each treated unit. The reweighting method proposed by HIR
reweights all untreated units in the sense that it mimics the mean of the distribution.










(1 − ˆ p(Xi))
￿
is an unbiased estimator of the average treatment eﬀect, ATE = E(y1
i − y0
i), where ˆ p(Xi) is the
estimated propensity score. As the weights for treated do not add up to one10, they have to be
normalized. Similarly, they have to be normalized for the untreated.
Similarly, the ATT = E(y1
i − y0











(1 − ˆ p(Xi))
￿
which is just a reweighted simple diﬀerence (est. 7). Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003) show
that this estimator is eﬃcient, with a fully nonparametric estimator for the propensity score. The
weights have to be normalized to add up to one for treated units and for untreated units. Therefore,















This is exactly similar as a WLS estimator of β is the model
yi = α + βmi + ε

















































ˆ p(Xi) ∗ (1 − mi)
(1 − ˆ p(Xi))
￿
This regression model could be extended adding covariates to the regression function to improve
the precision (weighted control regression, est. 8), without loosing consistency.
The two estimators (including covariates or not) are based on the idea that the propensity score
can be used to reweight outcomes in order to correct for the bias induced by the X. HIR show that
this estimator is eﬃcient. The ATU can be estimated similarly.
If the ignorability assumption is assumed to be true, why are estimation methods based on the
propensity score (matching or reweighting) interesting compared to simple controlled regression? The
crucial assumption is the common support assumption. The goal of the estimation of the propensity
score is of course the estimation of a measure of how close are treated and untreated units, but also
to get rid oﬀ "outliers" in terms of treatment. By trimming part of the support for which only
treated or untreated units are observed, the econometrician drops observations that are not relevant
in the sense that for this combination of X, there is no variation in the treatment status. Regression
methods extrapolate the results to the oﬀ support observations relying heavily on parametric forms.
Matching and weighting methods give a non parametric estimation of the impact of treatment, while
the ignorability assumption gives a causal interpretation to the estimator. In practice, a parametric
propensity score is although estimated, but the impact of the treatment on the outcome is not
parametric.
Therefore, matching and reweighting are methods to correct the selection on observables. As
explained in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), there are three potential sources of bias
in classical OLS regression when estimating the impact of a treatment on an outcome:
(i) Diﬀerent support of X between controlled and treated units could induce bias.
(ii) The diﬀerence of the distribution of X between the two groups over its common support could
induce bias
(iii) Selection on unobservables could of course induce bias. But this means that the CIA assumption
does not hold in that case, challenging the required assumption of ignorability of the treatment.
All the estimators presented above tend to eliminate the bias due to (i) and (ii). As there is no









































1I give estimates using all of them. I compare the results to the classic control regression models.
5.2.1 Basic assumptions
The basic assumptions necessary for a causal interpretation of the impact of treatment are ignorability
and common support. I claim these assumptions are likely to be veriﬁed when studying the impact
of marriage on credit constraints, providing that a set of relevant covariates is available. Relevant
covariates mean here that the covariate are correlated to marital status and impact the credit decision
of the banker.
Credit constraints result from the decision of the bank. Therefore, when addressing the ques-
tion of ignorability, one has to think about the covariates that could matter for the decision of the
bank. The main covariates are the income, the wealth and characteristics on employment (as stated
previously in section 4.2), because the main preoccupation of the bank should be to avoid the risk
of default. Ignorability means that the joint outcomes are independent from the choice of getting
married of the couple, conditional on these covariates. In other words, what is important is that the
unobserved part of the decision of the bank to approve the credit is not correlated to the unobserved
part of the decision of the couple to get married. This assumption is likely to be violated if there are
some omitted factors correlated to marital status, that matter for the decision of the bank, observed
by the banker but not by the econometrician and which are not completely cleared up by the set of
covariates. This kind of omitted factor could be the social background of the couple. There is no way
to test for that kind of factors but they can be partly correlated to income, education and wealth,
that are controlled for. More over, this is not clear that such a factor would inﬂuence the bank per
se. This is more likely that they are other signal for the seriousness of the couple. But in that case,
I interpret as an impact of the marriage the impact of this other factor.
The set of covariates used to study the impact of marriage on credit constraints at the extensive
margin includes income and some demographic characteristics: male age, female age, annual income
of the household (I cannot distinguish the male’s from the female’s income), number of kids, female
education, male education, a dummy indicating if the female works part time, and dummies indicat-
ing if the spouses work in the public sector. The income is the current income, as it is not possible
to measure the permanent income although the theory predicts that the bank takes into account the
permanent income. However, the approximation is not bad if the current income reﬂects well the









































1so I don’t observe it for rejected couples. So I do not have any proxy for the wealth of constrained
households. This is likely to bias my results, as it is an important covariate. However, it will bias the
result if it is highly correlated to the marital status. On the sample of new owners, I can compare the
amount of downpayment for married and unmarried couples (table 6). The downpayment is similar for
married and unmarried couples when not constrained, but unmarried couples tend to have an higher
downpayment than married couples, among constrained couples (the diﬀerence is slightly signiﬁcant
at a 10% level, see table 18). This is not clear if the diﬀerence in downpayments between married and
unmarried couples would be greater for constrained (at the extensive margin) than for constrained (at
the intensive margin) couples. If so, it is likely to bias downward my results: downpayment should
facilitate the credit and unmarried couples have a higher downpayment. Moreover, if the wealth is
strongly correlated to the covariates including in the matching procedure, then the bias is removed
by conditioning on the set of observable covariates. I do not include in the set of covariates the size
of the life town because this is highly endogenous for those who access to ownership. I do not include
neither some covariates that might seem important for the banker, such as the distribution of income
among the partners that could be informative but it is not observed in the data. However, I included
a dummy indicating if the female works part time as a proxy for a large diﬀerence in the male’s and
the female’s income.
The set of relevant covariates to address the issue of credit constraints at the intensive margin
depends on the outcome. Following Hayashi (1985b), I study six diﬀerent outcomes
1. The total amount borrowed in level, in order to detect any restriction on quantities
2. The total amount borrowed, calculated in years of income
3. The value of the downpayment, in order to check if the second constraint is more binding for
unmarried couples
4. The part of the value of the house ﬁnanced by the downpayment, to check how binding the
other constraint is
5. The level of income, in order to check if the required level of income is diﬀerent for married and
unmarried couples for a ﬁx debt
6. The total cost of the loan, in order to detect any restriction in prices.
I deﬁne a set of covariates composed of demographic characteristics as well as education and









































1a diploma higher than high school, same for female, number of kids, male’s age, female’s age, and
dummies for the sector of activity. This set is common to all outcomes. As for the computation of
the propensity score for the study of constraints at the extensive margin, the repartition of income
among the household is not included in the sets of covariates. Each of the six outcomes (except the
total amount borrowed, calculated in years of income) are included in the set of ﬁxed covariates when
it is not the explained variable. So the set of covariates included for the computation of the propen-
sity score is diﬀerent for each covariate. As this set of variables sums up all the key characteristics
determining the access to credit, the ignorability hypothesis is likely to hold.
The common support would be unlikely if there was no variation in the life cycle among couples.
For example, if all couples were to get married at age a. In that case, the common support assumption
could not be veriﬁed because at age a+1, all couples are married and there are not unmarried couples.
This means that the assumption requires some heterogeneity in the life cycle dynamic of couples, with
some getting marrying older than other, having kids at diﬀerent ages, etc. This assumption is likely
to hold because marriage is not a neutral institution and there is heterogeneity in the preferences of
couples toward marriage. But these preferences should not be correlated to the decision of the bank
to approve a credit because it would violate the ignorability assumption.
6 Results
6.1 Estimation of the propensity score
As explained in section 5.2, all the estimators for the ATT or the ATU (matching kernel and nearest
neighbors, weighted estimators) rely on the estimation of the propensity score, except the matching
estimator based on the Mahalanobis metric. The propensity score is estimated parametrically, using
a logit speciﬁcation.
Two sets of covariates are being used. They include the same variables, but the ﬁrst set (Set
1 thereafter) includes discretized continuous covariates (age, income) while the second set (Set 2)
includes the continuous covariates. Introducing discrete covariates is useful because it allows for non
linearities in the impact of X on mi. For each outcome, I test both sets of variables.
The estimation of the propensity scores for the study of constraints at the extensive margin is
given by tab 10. The estimation conﬁrms what the descriptive statistics illustrates: married couples
are richer, more educated, have more children, are a little older and more often works in the public









































1is given by tab 11 and 12. The sample of indebted households likely to be constrained is very small
compared to the sample of households willing to invest. As a consequence, the estimation of the
propensity score gives less clear results. However, it conﬁrms that constrained indebted married
couples have more children, the male more often works in public sector and the female is older and
they tend to be more educated than indebted unmarried couples.
In order to ensure the common support assumption (equation 2), I drop the extreme values of
the common support, i.e. those observations which propensity score is greater than 95% or lower
than 0.15%. Figure 3 draw the distribution of the propensity score (treatment=marriage) for married
and unmarried couples. This propensity score is computed on the subsample used to study the
credit constraints (strict deﬁnition). The propensity score for the study of the credit constraints
(board deﬁnition) is not exactly the same because the population is not the same. Anyway, as the
sets of covariates are strictly identical and the populations are very close, the distribution of the
propensity score is very close to this one. Although the distribution is not identical, the common
support assumption is clearly veriﬁed here, because for each level of the propensity score, there are
both married and unmarried couples. The propensity scores obtained with each set of variables are
very similar to each other.
The study of credit constraints at the intensive margin is based on an other subsample of house-
holds, the sample of indebted households. Figure 4 draw the distribution of the propensity score
(treatment=marriage) for married and unmarried couples. This propensity score is computed on the
subsample used to study the total cost of marriage (individual characteristics + debt, downpayment,
% of downpayment). This ﬁgure only gives one distribution for one propensity score as an exam-
ple, although I estimate one propensity score for each outcome. The common support assumption
is veriﬁed for levels of the propensity score greater than 0.5. This is why I only keep observations
having a propensity score greater then 0.5. Then, the distribution are quite similar. This tend to
show that indebted couples are quite similar on observables, are they married or not. The shape
of the propensity score depends on which covariates are included in the estimation. Therefore, as
the set of included covariates depends on the explained outcome, the propensity score is diﬀerent for
each outcome. However, as the set of covariates is very similar in each case, there are similar to the
propensity score presented in ﬁgure 4.
For each outcome, I compute two impacts of marriage: the average treatment eﬀect on the treated,
where being treated is being married (ATT), and the average treatment eﬀect on the untreated, i.e on









































1necessarily the same in both population with matching estimators. They are the same with simple
diﬀerence and OLS estimation as these methods suppose constant treatment eﬀects. The ATT gives
the impact of marriage for those who got married, and the ATU gives the impact of marriage for
the unmarried, if they were to get married. I expect that the ATT gives that married couples tend
to have a greater access to credit and better terms. Similarly, I expect that the ATU indicates that
unmarried couples would not beneﬁt from being married.
The estimation of the propensity score is very important as it deﬁnes the weights attributed to
the untreated units to make them similar to the treated unit. Then, the diﬀerent estimators diﬀer in
the way they use the propensity score to compute the weights. So, any diﬀerence in the estimations
comes from the diﬀerent weights. Figure 5 and 6 compare the weights attributed to the untreated
unit as a function of the propensity score by each estimator. For comparison reasons, the matching
weights are normalized to sum up to one. The Mahalanobis weights are clearly less precise and give
more weight to untreated units unlikely to be treated (for who the propensity score is low) than the
estimators based on the propensity score. The HIR and kernel weights are very similar, except for
high values of the propensity score. The HIR and the nearest neighbors weights are similar, but the
nearest neighbors introduce more variation at each level of the propensity score.
The goal of the matching is to deﬁne weights that correct for the bias induced by the diﬀerences
in the observable variables between married and unmarried couples. So a good test is to compare
married to reweighted unmarried. The two population should be similar after reweighting. I perform
a χ2 test for the balancing of the two populations. As the set of covariates is diﬀerent for each
outcome, I have estimated a propensity score for each outcome. Moreover, the χ2 test is weights
speciﬁc, so I have to compute one test for each weight and propensity score. As a consequence, I have
performed estimators using 128 set of weights: for each outcome: I need to test for the 2 outcomes
at the extensive margin, because the population are diﬀerent and for the 6 at the intensive margin
because the set of covariates includes for each outcomes other features of the debt. I test 2 sets of
variables (discrete and continuous), I compute 2 treatment eﬀects (ATT and ATU), using 4 set of
weights (nearest neighbors matching, kernel matching, mahalanobis metric, HIR weights). There is
no reason a priori that the sample would be balanced for each of them after reweighting. Table
13 shows the p-value of the χ2 tests of overall signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between covariates after
reweighting. Although the reweighting sample is balanced in most cases, some diﬀerences remain
for the ﬁrst set of variables with nearest neighbors and mahalanobis weights for the study of credit









































1variables, whatever the outcome. A bad balancing prevents from interpreting the estimates because
it means that diﬀerences in observables remain after the reweighting.
6.2 On declarative credit constraints: constraints at the extensive margin
Table 7 shows that the probability of being constrained (strict or broad deﬁnition) at the extensive
margin decreases with annual income. The point estimate is larger for the deﬁnition including dis-
couraged borrowers, meaning that income is a key criterion of self selection. Educated couples are
less constrained: having a diploma decreases the probability of being constrained, and the female’s
education has a larger impact than male’s education, for both deﬁnition of credit constraints. The
point estimate of female’s education is larger for credit constrained including discouraged borrowers,
whereas the point estimate of the male’s education is similar. It means that female’s education could
alter the decision to apply for a credit. Children and male’s age do not impact credit constraints, but
female’s age do, especially for the measure including discourage borrowers. Having savings increases
the probability of being constrained, when the discouraged borrowers are included.
Table 7 also shows that married couples have higher income, the male is more educated, but
married female are less educated than their unmarried counterparts. They are older than unmarried
couples. Therefore, the direction of the bias is not clear: married couples tend to share characteris-
tics increasing credit constrained (female less educated and older) but also characteristics decreasing
credit constraints (more income and more educated males).
Table 14 gives the results for the impact of being married using the strict deﬁnition. The simple
diﬀerence indicates that among married couples there are 1.4% (in % points) less constrained couples
than among unmarried couples, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant: on the subsample of couples on the
common support, unmarried couples do not seem to be turned down more often than married couples.
However, the sign of the coeﬃcient is negative, meaning that married couples experience slightly less
credit constraints than unmarried couples. Introducing controls does not alter this result. Matching
and weighting estimators tend to decrease the point estimate, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant
neither, both for the ATT and the ATU. The estimator based on the Mahalanobis metric gives a
lower point estimate for the ATU than other estimators. The Mahalanobis metric tends to weight
more couples that are unlikely to get married according to the propensity score. If those couples are
unconstrained unmarried couples then it tends to decrease the diﬀerence between the two groups. The
HIR weights give signiﬁcant credit constraints with the second set of variables, indicating that being









































1HIR weights are very close (in that case) to the kernel weights but the kernel estimator does not give
signiﬁcant results. The HIR weights give more weights to unmarried couples having a high propensity
score than the kernel estimator: the diﬀerence in the point estimate could be explained by strong
credit constraints for unmarried couples very similar to married couples. According to the nearest
neighbors estimators, unmarried couples would experience 2.8% points less credit constraints were
they married (with the ﬁrst set of covariates), but other estimators do not support this result. Taken
together, the estimators tend to conclude that if any, the impact of marriage on the probability of
being turned down is very low in percentage point. But a back of the envelop calculation indicates that
the impact is quite big: notice that 4.0% of married couples are credit constraints (at the extensive
margin, strict deﬁnition). The HIR estimation indicates that if the impact of marriage for married
couples on credit constraints reduces 1.7 percentage points the number of credit constraints household.
So it corresponds to a decrease of 29.8% of credit constraints households among the married couples
(1.7/(4+1.7)). Similarly, there are 5.2% of credit constraints households (strict deﬁnition) among the
unmarried. The nearest neighbors estimators indicate that being married would decrease with 2.8
percentage points the probability of being constrained if married. So if all of got married, it would
decrease the probability of constrained household among this population with 53.4% (2.8/5.2). The
sign of the estimate is robust and remains negative for almost all estimators. The comparison between
matching estimators shows that unmarried couples similar to married couples are more likely to be
constrained.
Table 15 gives the results of the impact of marriage on credit constraints, including discouraged
borrowers. The simple diﬀerence is negative and signiﬁcant. It indicates that there are 2.2% (%
points) more credit constrained household among unmarried couples than among married couples:
unmarried couples seem more credit constrained than married couples. The matching estimators give
larger (but not signiﬁcant) point estimates than the simple diﬀerence. Because of a lower variance,
the HIR weighing estimators give signiﬁcant results: if they were not married, married couples would
have experience an increase in their credit constraints from 2.4% to 3.0%, in % points (including
controls). The HIR estimation of the ATU, however, is not signiﬁcant: unmarried couples would
not experience lower credit constraints if they were married. The nearest neighbors and the maha-
lanobis estimators indicate that unmarried couples would also experience signiﬁcantly lower credit
constraints if they were married. Higher point estimates mean that married couples have observ-
able characteristics that would aﬀect them if they were not married, such characteristics could be
a less educated female. Notice that 7% of married couples are constrained at the extensive margin









































1HIR weights, being married decreases the number of constrained household with 26.3% (2.5/(2.5+7)).
The diﬀerence between the strict deﬁnition of credit constraints and broad deﬁnition is the inclu-
sion of discouraged borrowers. Of course, the ignorability assumption is likely to be violated in the
case of discouraged borrowers. There might be some unobserved factors, such as the decision to form
a household that are positively correlated to the intention to apply (so negatively to credit constraint)
for a credit and marriage. This would bias downward the impact of marriage on credit constraints,
and so increase the diﬀerence between married and unmarried. So, the diﬀerence between the results
for the two deﬁnitions shows that married couples tend to be less discouraged, maybe because of the
dynamic of the formation of the household. As the bank does not discriminate on the marital status,
the results do not support the signalling assumption of marriage.
6.3 On the measure of credit constraints at the intensive margin
First of all, notice that approved couples for a loan do not necessarily contract a loan. Among
approved couples, only 56% have indeed contracted a loan (1242 over 2231). It means that there
is a selection, between approved couples, of who access to ownership. To study this selection, it
would be interesting to observe the terms of the loan couples were approved for. As shows in ﬁg. 2,
the selection of approved couples is more important among unmarried couples than among married
couples: 64% of married couples approved for a loan eventually contract a loan whereas only 40% of
them eventually do.
On the subsample of credit constraints households (deﬁned as in section 4.2.2), the impact of
covariates on credit outcomes are presented in table 8 for the ﬁrst set of covariates and table 9 for
the second set of covariates. Controlled for the characteristics of the loan, the value of the debt does
not seem to be correlated with other household covariates (column (1) and (2)). The total cost of
the debt11 is correlated to the characteristics of the loan, but also to the employment status of the
woman: working part time is positively correlated to the cost of the loan and having two or more
children is negatively correlated to the cost (column (3)). The downpayment is positively correlated
to the education of the partners, and the female’s age (column (4)). This could be explained by
assets accumulation over the life cycle. The percentage of downpayment is mostly correlated to the
characteristics of the debt, and positively to the employment status of the woman (column (6)). A
higher income is correlated with a higher debt, higher downpayment and lower cost. But it is also
negatively correlated to part time activity, education and children (column (7)).









































1Married couples tend to be a bit diﬀerent than unmarried couples: the woman is older, they
have more children and the female is often less educated than unmarried counterparts. Their loan
is similar to the loan of unmarried couples. The diﬀerences between married and unmarried couples
justify using matching methods because they are likely to be correlated to credit constrants.
Table 16 shows that married couples tend to borrow 5248 euros (with set 1) less than unmarried
couples, although the diﬀerence is slightly signiﬁcant. The sign is robust to all estimators. The
controlled OLS and the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition reinforce the impact of marriage (the controlled
OLS regression give signiﬁcant results for both set of covariates), while matching estimator do not
give clear results. HIR weights conﬁrm the simple diﬀerence estimation, indicating that married
couples borrow less than unmarried couples (6840 euros for the set 1, 9895 for the set 2). This result
is surprising because it does not support the main idea of the signalling theory.
However, this crude deﬁnition of the value of the debt might not be adapted: even if the income
is controlled for, the relationship between income and debt could be diﬀerent than linear. Instead, I
consider measuring the debt in terms of annual income. Table 17 shows that married households are
signiﬁcantly less indebted than unmarried couples, and decrease their debt by 0.17 annual income.
While the controlled OLS coeﬃcient tends to support this result, the estimation based on matching
and reweighting estimators tend to lower the point estimate for the ATT, which become not signiﬁcant
and to increase the coeﬃcient for the ATU that remains signiﬁcant. As a consequence, married couples
would not lower the amount borrowed if they were not married, but unmarried couples would have a
lower debt.
Married couples tend to have a lower downpayment than unmarried couples, although the sim-
ple diﬀerence is slightly signiﬁcant, but there is no diﬀerence between couples in the downpayment
expressed as a proportion of the value of the housing (tables 18 and 19). This is easily explained
by the diﬀerences in the value of the debt. Matching and reweighted estimators tend to show that
married couple would have even lower downpayment, have they not been married (than what indi-
cates the simple diﬀerence) and unmarried couples would have decrease, although not signiﬁcantly
the value of their downpayment. The matching and reweighting estimators control for the value of
the debt. Therefore, the diﬀerences in the value of the downpayment could be interpret as the reward
of being married. The ATT tends to be signiﬁcant with the HIR weights, meaning that married
couples should bring more downpayment, would they be unmarried, but the ATU is not signiﬁcant:
unmarried couples would not beneﬁt from such a reward. This diﬀerence could be explained by the









































1unmarried couples. The ATT is computed by reweighting the unmarried: therefore the signiﬁcant
diﬀerence means that the marital status could have an impact per se on the demanded downpayment
when the woman is inactive. The ATU is computed by reweighting the married couples: when the
woman is working full time, the marital status does not impact the value of the downpayment. The
proportion of downpayment is not aﬀected by the marital status (table 19). The simple diﬀerence in
table 21 conﬁrms that married couples are slightly wealthier than unmarried couples. Reweighting for
demographic and debt characteristics does not reverse the sign of the coeﬃcient: married households
require the same income to borrow a ﬁxed debt, keeping the downpayment and the cost of the loan
constant.
Surprisingly, the table 20 points out a higher cost of credit for married couples. While the simple
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant, controlled OLS and matching and reweighting estimator using the second
set of variables give signiﬁcant and even higher point estimates for the impact of marriage on the cost
of credit. The ﬁrst set of variables gives qualitatively similar results, but not signiﬁcant (althought it
stays close to be signiﬁcant). Why is the cost higher for married couples? The description of the loans
contracted by couples in table 4 shows that married couples contract lower debt and they contract less
often a zero rate loan (prêt à taux zéro, PTZ). I have tested this assumption computing the cost of
the loan without taking into account PTZ loans (results not showed here) and the total cost remains
higher for married couples. The mean duration is similar for married (15.39) than unmarried couples
(15.45) and the mean interest rates oﬀered are very close, and a bit higher for unmarried (3.66% for
married and 3.69% for unmarried). Therefore, the diﬀerence in the total cost must be explained by
a diﬀerent structure of the debt.
As a consequence, the overall results given by the analysis are quite surprising. Married couples
do not seem to be advantaged on the credit market, if not disadvantaged: the cost of the loan is higher
and they are approved for lower debts. These surprising results can be related to the self selection
process highlighted above. Among unmarried, the discouraged borrowers could be those having the
worst credit proposals, while married couples having the same proposals, are not discouraged because
of some omitting factors, such as the willingness to form a household. The self selection is reinforced
by the selection in the contract, because all approved borrowers did not eventually contract a loan.
Therefore, even if the ignorability assumption is likely to hold when considering the credit supply, it
is not likely to hold considering that what is observed is also conditional on couples agreeing on the
conditions of the bank. So, high costs could have discouraged more elastic couples: unmarried couples










































This paper investigates the link between marriage and credit constraints, using the French housing
survey in 2001. The leading idea is that marriage could be used as a signal toward the bank of
the quality of the match. I estimate the impact of marriage on credit constraints using matching
estimators to match married couples to unmarried couples. I propose diﬀerent matching estimators.
The comparison of matching estimators is interesting as a robustness check: for all outcomes, some
estimators give signiﬁcant results and some do not. This comparison highlights the sensitivity of the
estimators to the choice of the set of covariates and to the weights attributed by the matching process.
The HIR weights are taken as the most relevant as they give more eﬃcient estimators.
The results tend to support the idea that married couples are less credit constrained at the exten-
sive margin, when discouraged borrowers are included, but not when they are excluded. Therefore,
it is diﬃcult to interpret this result as the direct impact of marriage. It mostly supports the idea
of selection in the marriage, that appeals couples willing to form a household. On the contrary, the
results show the married couples are worst oﬀ on the credit market. This should not be seen as a
negative impact of marriage but as the consequence of selection in the marriage. Married couples are
more likely to accept less advantageous credits than unmarried couples. Therefore, the marriage is
indeed correlated to outcomes on the credit market, although the hypothesis of marriage as signal is
not veriﬁed. These results are interesting in a long run perspective. The number of cohabitant couples
is increasing in France, because of the increase in cohabitation before marriage and of cohabitation
as a permanent state. This evolution could have dilute the value of marriage as a signal. Therefore,
it could be interesting to complete this study including older and more recent waves of the survey,
in order to study the evolution of credit constraints. Moreover, it could be interested to investigate
if other characteristics could be used as signal of the stability of the couple, such as children or labor
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Table 1: Households experiencing ﬁnancial diﬃculties, by matrimonial status
Experienced Financial diﬃculties:
Never Less than During the Total
1 y. ago last years
Single, never separated 74.4 12.2 13.3 100.0
Couple, not separated 76.5 8.4 15.1 100.0
Unmarried 69.1 16.3 14.6 100.0
Married 78.2 7.0 14.8 100.0
Separation <1 y. ago 51.8 31.8 16.4 100.0
Previously unmarried 56.1 30.6 13.3 100.0
Previously married 48.3 36.0 15.7 100.0
Separation ]1,5] y. ago 55.1 15.1 29.7 100.0
Previously unmarried 55.0 17.8 27.1 100.0
Previously married 55.5 13.6 30.9 100.0
Total 73.1 10.2 16.8 100.0
Source: Assets survey 1998 Enquête Patrimoine 1998 - The
subsample excludes household with at least one self employed
spouse.
Lecture: 56.1% of individuals that broke up from an unmar-
ried couple less than one year ago never experienced ﬁnancial
diﬃculties.
Table 2: Main declared reason of ﬁnancial diﬃculty
Main declared reason of ﬁnancial diﬃculty
Professional Personnal Current Refund Total
(e.g. unemployment) (incl. separation) expenses Total
Single, never separated 39.9 11.5 42.7 5.9 100.0
Couple, not separated 45.0 8.2 40.5 6.3 100.0
Unmarried 53.3 7.5 37.2 2.0 100.0
Married 42.7 7.6 42.6 7.2 100.0
Separation <1 y. ago 28.3 50.9 20.8 0.0 100.0
Previously unmarried 27.9 30.2 41.9 0.0 100.0
Previously married 37.0 58.7 4.3 0.0 100.0
Separation ]1,5] y. ago 40.8 29.3 28.0 1.9 100.0
Previously unmarried 50.0 19.0 27.6 3.4 100.0
Previously married 37.6 32.9 28.2 1.2 100.0
Separation >5 y. ago 37.9 21.4 38.3 2.4 100.0
Previously unmarried 52.8 11.1 33.3 2.8 100.0
Previously married 33.5 23.9 40.0 2.6 100.0
Total 42.2 14.3 38.4 5.1 100.0
Source: Assets survey 1998 Enquête Patrimoine 1998 - The subsample excludes household
with at least one self employed spouse.
Lecture: 27.9% of individuals that broke up from an unmarried couple less than one year








































































1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Housing price, baseline 2001= 100
Rate of national bonds
Mean rate for long term housing loans
Figure 1: Macroeconomic variables




Was with another partner 5 years ago 19,776
Keep renters and recent owners 11,010
Drop owners having other goods 10,025
Drop self-employed 9,106
Drop if male does not full time 7,045
Drop if female inactive 5,353
Willingness to invest 2,410 (strict) 2,508 (broad)














































Married, N : 694;31%




Married, N : 1551;69%




Married, N : 49;3.2%




Married, N : 1502;96.8%




Married, N : 60;4.0%




Married, N : 1442;96.0%




Married, N : 514;36%




Married, N : 928;64%
Unmarried, N : 314;40%
Unconstrained household: Want→Apply→Approved (2213 couples).
Strict deﬁnition of constrained household: Want→Apply→Not Approved (102 couples).











































Table 4: Descriptive statistics - characteristics of indebted households, depending if they are credit
constrained at the intensive margin
Unconstrained Constrained
Unmarried Married Total Unmarried Married Total
Annual Income 38088 40028 39527 29633 30711 30459
Male age 32.88 35.8 35.05 32.47 34.62 34.11
Female age 31.4 34.07 33.38 30.63 32.93 32.39
Nb of kids .72 1.42 1.24 .96 1.42 1.31
Female works part time .2 .33 .3 .36 .42 .41
Male works in public sector .2 .27 .25 .13 .21 .19
Female works in public sector .29 .35 .33 .28 .28 .28
Male diploma
No diploma .09 .09 .09 .07 .08 .08
Up to High school .52 .53 .52 .7 .66 .67
Some college .4 .39 .39 .22 .25 .24
Female diploma
No diploma .05 .08 .07 .04 .09 .08
Up to High school .42 .47 .46 .56 .63 .62
Some college .53 .45 .47 .39 .27 .3









































1Table 5: Descriptive statistics, depending on constraint status at the extensive margin
Unconstrained Constrained (strict) Constrained (broad)
Unmarried Married All Unmarried Married All Unmarried Married All
Annual Income 31924 35015 33938 24359 28035 26521 23306 27456 25751
Male age 31.23 35.16 33.79 31.64 35.28 33.78 31.41 35.89 34.05
Female age 29.66 33.45 32.13 29.83 32.7 31.52 29.92 33.92 32.28
Nb of kids .63 1.39 1.13 .67 1.57 1.2 .79 1.59 1.26
Male works in public sector .19 .24 .23 .17 .13 .15 .16 .16 .16
Female Activity
works part time .27 .38 .34 .38 .42 .4 .46 .46 .46
Unemployed .08 .09 .09 .19 .18 .19 .25 .21 .23
Employed .92 .91 .91 .81 .82 .81 .75 .79 .77
Female works in public sector .29 .3 .3 .24 .25 .25 .25 .2 .22
Male diploma
No diploma .09 .11 .1 .36 .27 .3 .29 .23 .25
Up to High school .62 .59 .6 .5 .58 .55 .57 .61 .59
Some college .29 .3 .3 .14 .15 .15 .14 .16 .15
Female diploma
No diploma .06 .12 .09 .17 .35 .27 .18 .32 .26
Up to High school .51 .52 .52 .69 .53 .6 .67 .5 .57
Some college .43 .36 .39 .14 .12 .13 .14 .17 .16










































1Table 6: Descriptive statistics on credit
Constrained Unconstrained
Unmarried Married All Unmarried Married All
Value (in years of income) 4.134 3.744 3.836 2.562 2.69 2.658
Total debt 98324 98186 98218 73416 78719 77357
Debt (by year of income) 3.466 3.246 3.298 1.986 2.017 2.009
Downpayment 23237 18312 19480 24856 25861 25603
% no downpayment 0.186 0.234 0.222 0.243 0.202 0.212
% of the value in downpayment 0.153 0.134 0.139 0.222 0.211 0.214
Downpayment (inc. PTZ) 33454 28671 29806 28209 30860 30179
% no downpayment (inc. PTZ) 0.062 0.109 0.098 0.173 0.15 0.156
% of the value in downpayment (inc. PTZ) 0.253 0.241 0.244 0.266 0.261 0.263
Cost 1.463 1.49 1.484 1.507 1.497 1.5
Eﬀort rate 0.274 0.262 0.265 0.178 0.187 0.185




















































































1Table 7: Impact of covariates on credit constraints at the extensive margin - OLS regressions
Credit Constrained (strict) Credit Constrained (broad) Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income: among 33-66% -0.0332a -0.0667a 0.0344
(0.0111) (0.0140) (0.0235)
Income: among the top 33% -0.0351a -0.0740a 0.0823a
(0.0129) (0.0164) (0.0275)
Woman works part time -0.0034 0.0003 0.0067 0.0126 0.0309 0.0263
(0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0201) (0.0198)
Male education: up to high school -0.0577a -0.0597a -0.0543a -0.0573a 0.0340 0.0427
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0308) (0.0307)
Male education: some college -0.0497a -0.0512a -0.0458b -0.0449b 0.0694c 0.0838b
(0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0370) (0.0370)
Female education: up to high school -0.0488a -0.0519a -0.0753a -0.0796a -0.0676b -0.0496
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0322) (0.0322)
Female education: some college -0.0744a -0.0777a -0.0987a -0.1011a -0.0978a -0.0685c
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0378) (0.0378)
Has 1 child -0.0108 -0.0129 -0.0005 -0.0032 0.1953a 0.1970a
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0232) (0.0230)
Has 2 children (or more) -0.0027 -0.0036 0.0121 0.0132 0.3307a 0.3334a
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0250) (0.0246)
Male age: ∈ [31,35] 0.0061 0.0181 0.0631b
(0.0129) (0.0163) (0.0274)
Male age: ≥ 36 0.0122 0.0281 0.0997a
(0.0156) (0.0197) (0.0331)
Female age: ∈ [29,33] -0.0180 -0.0179 -0.0366b -0.0332b 0.0660b 0.0557b
(0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0273) (0.0257)
Female age: ≥ 34 -0.0334b -0.0294c -0.0494b -0.0374c 0.0695b 0.0214
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0338) (0.0334)
Man: Works in public sector -0.0078 -0.0101 -0.0070 -0.0119 0.0585b 0.0570b
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0227) (0.0226)
Woman: Works in public sector 0.0113 0.0100 0.0069 0.0048 -0.0225 -0.0169
(0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0211) (0.0209)
Has savings -0.0124 -0.0135 -0.0245b -0.0265b -0.0118 -0.0088
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0187) (0.0186)
Income -0.0008b -0.0000a 0.0000c
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Male’s age 0.0002 0.0005 0.0117 a
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0021)
Constant 0.1915a 0.1973a 0.2649a 0.2828a 0.3464a -0.0154
(0.0192) (0.0358) (0.0240) (0.0452) (0.0403) (0.0756)
Observations 2315 2315 2398 2398 2398 2398
R2 0.040 0.038 0.056 0.052 0.170 0.175
Outcomes: (1) and (2)=1 if household constrained according to the strict deﬁnition
(3) and (4)= 1 if household constrained according to the board deﬁnition
(5) and (6)= 1 if married couple.












































1Table 8: Impact of covariates on credit constraints at the intensive margin (set of discrete variables)
- OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcomes:
Debt Debt Total cost Downp. Downp. Income Married
(in 1000) (in an.inc.) (in 1000) (in %) (in 1000)
Income: among 33-66% 13.3a -.465a -.0329 -3 -.0205 .0552
(2.78) (.0863) (.025) (3.47) (.0184) (.0577)
Income: among the top 33% 35.3a -.7a -.102a 4.86 -.0443c .11
(3.17) (.0983) (.0312) (4.42) (.0233) (.0736)
Downpayment:∈ [10%, 30%] 4.3 .149 -.107a 10a -.591 -.024
(3.16) (.0981) (.0263) (3.5) (1.01) (.0613)
Downpayment:> 30% -10.3b -.151 -.182a 38.9a -2.97b -.042
(4.34) (.135) (.0349) (4.02) (1.36) (.0835)
Downpayment ∈]0, 16000[ -5.88b -.291a -.00548 .0564a 1.12 -.0142
(2.99) (.0928) (.0254) (.018) (.945) (.0578)
Downpayment ≥ 16000 9.91a -.0364 .0188 .212a 4.94a -.0358
(3.67) (.114) (.0312) (.0185) (1.16) (.0711)
Total cost: among 33-66% 8.53a .14 -4.72 -.0621a -1.44 .0658
(2.79) (.0866) (3.3) (.0172) (.881) (.0545)
Total cost: among the top 33% 16.3a .438a -2.15 -.117a -3.04a .0962
(2.95) (.0915) (3.61) (.0182) (.947) (.0598)
Woman works part time -1.56 .0547 .073a -1.47 .0251c -2.19a -.00839
(2.44) (.0758) (.0204) (2.84) (.0149) (.763) (.047)
Man: Works in public sector -4.08 -.108 .0486c -2.67 .0139 .609 .0889
(3.05) (.0946) (.0256) (3.54) (.0187) (.955) (.0586)
Woman: Works in public sector -2.16 .00434 -.0439b -.904 .000263 .12 -.0351
(2.62) (.0814) (.0221) (3.05) (.0161) (.827) (.0504)
Male education: some college 4.73 -.109 -.0159 10.9a .00183 4.08a .0889
(3) (.0932) (.0253) (3.47) (.0184) (.938) (.0578)
Female education: some college 3.13 .0185 .0514b 9.03a -.00931 3.39a -.0823
(2.9) (.0901) (.0244) (3.36) (.0177) (.899) (.0558)
Has 1 child 3.69 -.122 -.0276 -1.5 .00592 1.47 .141b
(3.15) (.098) (.0265) (3.67) (.0194) (.996) (.0607)
Has 2 children (or more) 5.7c -.14 -.0442c -2.24 .0294 2.2b .223a
(3.19) (.099) (.0266) (3.69) (.0195) (1.01) (.0613)
Male age: ∈ [31, 35] -1.2 .054 .0416 -3.97 .011 .422 -.0144
(3.24) (.101) (.0272) (3.76) (.0199) (1.02) (.0623)
Male age: ≥ 36 1.06 .122 -.0127 .779 .00674 .599 -.0434
(3.74) (.116) (.0317) (4.36) (.023) (1.18) (.0722)
Female age: ∈ [29, 33] -1.83 -.0436 -.00441 1.31 .00585 .579 .131b
(3.08) (.0956) (.026) (3.57) (.0189) (.97) (.0592)
Female age: ≥ 34 -3.02 -.105 .0418 7.58c .00046 1.31 .177b
(3.89) (.121) (.0329) (4.47) (.0238) (1.23) (.075)
Debt: among 33-66% .071a 1.27 .00722 4.53a -.0148
(.0251) (3.52) (.0184) (.881) (.0585)
Debt: among the top 33% .153a 6.49 -.0186 10.6a -.109
(.0301) (4.32) (.0227) (.98) (.0722)
Constant 70a 3.72a 1.53a -3.49 .187a 21.7a .499a
(4.77) (.148) (.0359) (5.31) (.0269) (1.5) (.0926)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397
R2 0.475 0.287 0.216 0.377 0.436 0.522 0.113












































1Table 9: Impact of covariates on credit constraints at the intensive margin (set of continuous variables)
- OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcomes:
Debt Debt Total cost Downp. Downp. Income Married
(in 1000) (in an.inc.) (in 1000) (in %) (in 1000)
Income 2.47a -.033a -7.6e-03a .881a -7.1e-05 9.3e-03b
(.113) (4.5e-03) (1.8e-03) (.209) (1.2e-03) (4.1e-03)
% of downpayment -25.9a -1.17a -.321a 112a -.126 -.024
(7.03) (.281) (.075) (6.94) (2.15) (.175)
Downpayment .03 4.5e-03a 1.5e-04 3.6e-03a .051 a -1.2e-03
(.041) (1.6e-03) (4.3e-04) (2.2e-04) (.012) (9.9e-04)
Total cost 24.9a .786a 2.11 -.144a -6.05 a .201c
(4.62) (.185) (6.02) (.033) (1.41) (.117)
Woman works part time .941 .022 .067a .396 .036a -1.6a -.014
(1.9) (.076) (.02) (2.39) (.013) (.567) (.046)
Man: Works in public sector -2.83 -.14 .062b -2.29 8.4e-03 1.37c .081
(2.36) (.095) (.025) (2.97) (.017) (.71) (.058)
Woman: Works in public sector -1.17 -.011 -.038c -.734 -3.2e-03 .409 -.031
(2.04) (.082) (.022) (2.57) (.015) (.616) (.05)
Male education: some college -2.32 -.071 8.0e-03 3.87 -9.8e-04 2.91a .077
(2.36) (.095) (.025) (2.97) (.017) (.696) (.058)
Female education: some college -2.26 5.3e-03 .053b 8.18a -.023 2.32a -.089
(2.27) (.091) (.024) (2.83) (.016) (.676) (.056)
Has 1 child -.587 -.094 -.013 -3.71 .03c 1.4 c .135b
(2.43) (.097) (.026) (3.05) (.017) (.729) (.059)
Has 2 children (or more) .274 -.065 -.025 -7.38b .052a 1.54b .221a
(2.42) (.097) (.026) (3.02) (.017) (.725) (.059)
Male’s age .049 4.7e-03 -2.4e-03 .339 -1.9e-03 -.016 2.0e-03
(.254) (.01) (2.7e-03) (.319) (1.8e-03) (.077) (6.2e-03)
Female’s age -.197 -6.1e-03 3.7e-03 .087 4.5e-04 .137c 5.8e-03
(.245) (9.8e-03) (2.6e-03) (.309) (1.8e-03) (.074) (6.0e-03)
Debt 2.8e-03a .047 -1.3e-03a .224a -2.9e-03b
(5.3e-04) (.064) (3.6e-04) (.01) (1.2e-03)
Constant -2.06 3.49a 1.45a -55.2a .526a 10.3a .096
(9.77) (.391) (.073) (12) (.064) (2.89) (.239)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397
R2 0.674 0.263 0.221 0.547 0.524 0.729 0.106












































1Table 10: Estimation of the propensity score (extensive margin) P(mi = 1|Xi) Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Set of the outcome : Constraint (strict) Constraint (broad)
Income: among 33-66% .0884 .107
(.0745) (.0728)
Income: among the top 33% .249a .257a
(.0881) (.0865)
Woman works part time .116c .102 .0995 .0838
(.0655) (.0648) (.0642) (.0635)
Male education: up to high school .114 .142 .113 .139
(.0999) (.1) (.0968) (.0972)
Male education: some college .24b .292b .228c .277b
(.12) (.121) (.117) (.118)
Female education: up to high school -.261b -.213c -.236b -.181c
(.111) (.112) (.107) (.107)
Female education: some college -.386a -.302b -.331a -.245b
(.128) (.128) (.123) (.124)
Has 1 child .531a .536a .514a .521a
(.0695) (.0693) (.0682) (.068)
Has 2 children (or more) 1a 1.01a .985a .992a
(.0801) (.0795) (.0782) (.0777)
Male age: ∈ [31, 35] .142c .157c
(.0843) (.0824)
Male age: ≥ 36 .3a .287a
(.104) (.102)
Female age: ∈ [29, 33] .158c .102 .164b .113
(.0835) (.0798) (.0815) (.0781)
Female age: ≥ 34 .153 -.00447 .191c .027
(.106) (.106) (.103) (.104)
Man: Works in public sector .187b .181b .19a .186b
(.0738) (.0739) (.0726) (.0727)
Woman: Works in public sector -.0558 -.0438 -.0768 -.0632
(.0672) (.067) (.0662) (.0661)
Has savings -.0345 -.028 -.0319 -.024
(.0596) (.0597) (.0586) (.0587)
Income .00413 4.56e-06c
(.00265) (2.61e-06)
Male’s age .0371a .0369a
(.00698) (.00683)
Constant -.356a -1.5a -.399a -1.54a
(.135) (.25) (.13) (.244)
Observations 2315 2315 2398 2398




For all estimation, the outcome is mi = 1 if the couple is married.
Column (1) and (2): estimation of the propensity score for the popu-
lation excluding discouraged borrowers
Column (3) and (4): estimation of the propensity score for the popu-









































1Table 11: Estimation of the propensity score (intensive margin - Set 1) Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcomes:
Debt Debt Total cost Downp. Downp. Income All
(in 1000) (in an.inc.) (in 1000) (in %) (in 1000)
Income: among 33-66% .144 .144 .137 .18 .186 .189
(.189) (.189) (.201) (.203) (.205) (.205)
Income: among the top 33% .144 .144 .257 .349 .375 .366
(.212) (.212) (.252) (.258) (.259) (.26)
Downpayment:∈ [10%, 30%] -.133 -.133 -.181 -.156 -.128 -.119
(.22) (.22) (.216) (.211) (.221) (.222)
Downpayment:> 30% -.126 -.126 -.296 -.243 -.184 -.155
(.296) (.296) (.283) (.24) (.293) (.296)
Downpayment ∈]0, 16000[ -.0337 -.0337 -.0433 -.0827 -.0398 -.0647
(.205) (.205) (.208) (.205) (.207) (.208)
Downpayment ≥ 16000 -.183 -.183 -.13 -.203 -.0936 -.138
(.247) (.247) (.25) (.209) (.247) (.25)
Total cost: among 33-66% .164 .164 .213 .221 .171 .213
(.186) (.186) (.189) (.186) (.186) (.189)
Total cost: among the top 33% .251 .251 .357c .389c .285 .359c
(.198) (.198) (.212) (.203) (.205) (.212)
Woman works part time -.0296 -.0296 -.0204 -.0374 -.0477 -.0678 -.0374
(.167) (.167) (.165) (.167) (.166) (.166) (.167)
Man: Works in public sector .36 .36 .39c .372c .361 .398c .365
(.222) (.222) (.221) (.223) (.223) (.221) (.223)
Woman: Works in public sector -.144 -.144 -.169 -.149 -.147 -.142 -.151
(.176) (.176) (.177) (.177) (.176) (.176) (.177)
Male education: some college .286 .286 .272 .289 .315 .336c .304
(.205) (.205) (.203) (.204) (.204) (.203) (.206)
Female education: some college -.29 -.29 -.249 -.287 -.274 -.232 -.278
(.191) (.191) (.19) (.191) (.191) (.187) (.192)
Has 1 child .424b .424b .401b .443b .431b .446b .44b
(.201) (.201) (.2) (.202) (.202) (.202) (.202)
Has 2 children (or more) .733a .733a .715a .756a .734a .752a .747a
(.211) (.211) (.209) (.211) (.21) (.212) (.212)
Male age: ∈ [31, 35] -.0562 -.0562 -.0399 -.0525 -.0504 -.0205 -.0505
(.211) (.211) (.211) (.211) (.211) (.211) (.212)
Male age: ≥ 36 -.192 -.192 -.166 -.155 -.156 -.142 -.157
(.252) (.252) (.254) (.254) (.253) (.253) (.254)
Female age: ∈ [29, 33] .4b .4b .384c .393b .397b .407b .395b
(.196) (.196) (.196) (.196) (.196) (.196) (.197)
Female age: ≥ 34 .612b .612b .602b .572b .596b .612b .587b
(.261) (.261) (.262) (.259) (.262) (.262) (.263)
Debt: among 33-66% .0286 -.0309 -.0521 .064 -.0421
(.203) (.205) (.205) (.19) (.208)
Debt: among the top 33% -.237 -.392 -.391 -.179 -.387
(.242) (.252) (.254) (.21) (.258)
Constant -.0109 -.0109 .218 -.0502 -.109 .0237 -.0286
(.316) (.316) (.285) (.3) (.289) (.317) (.321)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397
R2
Standard errors in parentheses - c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Lecture: as the set of covariates is diﬀerent for each outcome, there are as many estimations of the propensity score as ﬁnal outcomes. But of
course, as it is an estimation of the propensity score, the dependant variable is mi = 1 if the couple is married. Column (1) gives the estimation










































1Table 12: Estimation of the propensity score (intensive margin - Set 2) Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcomes:
Debt Debt Total cost Downp. Downp. Income All
(in 1000) (in an.inc.) (in 1000) (in %) (in 1000)
Income 6.3e-03 6.3e-03 .023c .027b .032b .032b
(9.5e-03) (9.5e-03) (.014) (.014) (.015) (.015)
% of downpayment .209 .209 -.377 -.501 -.095 -.013
(.654) (.654) (.608) (.485) (.632) (.662)
Downpayment -4.1e-03 -4.1e-03 -3.4e-03 -3.8e-03 -2.1e-03 -3.8e-03
(3.3e-03) (3.3e-03) (3.1e-03) (2.4e-03) (3.1e-03) (3.2e-03)
Total cost .637 .637 1.01c 1.05b .728 1.05b
(.464) (.464) (.515) (.5) (.479) (.521)
Woman works part time -.076 -.076 -.013 -.07 -.071 -.117 -.071
(.166) (.166) (.163) (.166) (.165) (.165) (.166)
Man: Works in public sector .351 .351 .372c .342 .331 .362c .331
(.219) (.219) (.218) (.22) (.221) (.218) (.221)
Woman: Works in public sector -.114 -.114 -.163 -.127 -.128 -.119 -.128
(.174) (.174) (.175) (.176) (.176) (.174) (.176)
Male education: some college .298 .298 .262 .26 .279 .36c .279
(.204) (.204) (.203) (.203) (.205) (.201) (.205)
Female education: some college -.277 -.277 -.247 -.32c -.293 -.225 -.293
(.19) (.19) (.188) (.189) (.19) (.187) (.19)
Has 1 child .413b .413b .395b .433b .414b .453b .415b
(.197) (.197) (.196) (.197) (.196) (.196) (.198)
Has 2 children (or more) .735a .735a .717a .793a .762a .791a .763a
(.205) (.205) (.205) (.206) (.205) (.206) (.207)
Male’s age 9.4e-03 9.4e-03 8.6e-03 .01 .011 9.8e-03 .011
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Female’s age .017 .017 .017 .014 .015 .02 .015
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021)
Debt -7.2e-03c -.011b -.01b -3.0e-03 -.01b
(4.1e-03) (4.4e-03) (4.4e-03) (2.9e-03) (4.5e-03)
Constant -1.67c -1.67c -.375 -1.66c -1.95b -1.44 -1.94b
(.932) (.932) (.573) (.938) (.886) (.915) (.979)
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 397
R2




Lecture: as the set of covariates is diﬀerent for each outcome, there are as many estimations of the propensity score as
ﬁnal outcomes. But of course, as it is an estimation of the propensity score, the dependant variable is mi = 1 if the
couple is married. Column (1) gives the estimation of the propensity score when the set of covariate corresponds to the









































1Table 13: P-value of χ2 test for balancing of covariates
Outcome NN weights Kernel weights Mahalanobis weights HIR weights
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2
ATT ATU ATT ATU ATT ATU ATT ATU ATT ATU ATT ATU ATT ATU ATT ATU
CC - strict def. .17 .12 .89 .68 .38 .99 .19 .89 0 .93 0.01 .57 1 .9 1 .8
CC - broad def. .19 .61 .95 .85 .43 .98 .27 .92 0 .29 0 .61 1 .94 1 .86
Debt .91 1 .79 1 .98 1 .97 1 .15 .43 0.01 .98 1 1 1 .92
Downpayment .94 1 .33 1 .99 1 .79 1 .7 .71 0.01 .99 1 1 1 .85
Income .37 1 .5 1 1 1 .88 1 .63 .83 0.01 .93 1 1 1 .88
% of downp. .9 1 .43 1 .99 1 .88 1 .64 .82 0.02 .87 1 1 1 .86
Total cost .36 1 .04 1 .99 1 .98 1 .27 .74 0.04 1 1 1 1 .96
Debt (in annual inc.) .91 1 .79 1 .98 1 .97 1 .15 .43 0.01 .98 1 1 1 .92
Set 1: Discrete variables; Set 2: Continuous variables
Each cell gives the P-value of a χ2 test of overall balancing test.
Each row gives the tests for the matching procedure studying each outcome (the set of covariates is diﬀerent for each outcome).
Lecture: the P-value of the χ2 test of overall equality of covariates between the two population is 0.01 for the propensity score
computed to study credit constraints (strict deﬁnition) reweighting unmarried to make them similar to married couples (ATT)











































Table 14: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the extensive margin - strict deﬁnition
Credit constraints: strict deﬁnition
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence -0.014 ( 0.009 ) -0.013 ( 0.009 ) -0.014 ( 0.009 ) -0.013 ( 0.009 )
OLS (with controls) -0.009 ( 0.01 ) -0.01 ( 0.01 ) -0.009 ( 0.01 ) -0.01 ( 0.01 )
Oaxaca Blinder -0.012 ( 0.012 ) -0.013 ( 0.012 ) -0.009 ( 0.01 ) -0.008 ( 0.01 )
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -0.011 ( 0.012 ) -0.006 ( 0.012 ) -0.007 ( 0.01 ) -0.009 ( 0.011 )
Kernel (bs) -0.011 ( 0.011 ) -0.006 ( 0.011 ) -0.007 ( 0.012 ) -0.009 ( 0.011 )
Mahalanobis (ana) -0.005 ( 0.015 ) -0.005 ( 0.014 ) -0.027 ( 0.018 ) -0.023 ( 0.012 ) ∗
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -0.003 ( 0.015 ) -0.005 ( 0.013 ) -0.006 ( 0.013 ) -0.013 ( 0.012 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -0.01 ( 0.009 ) -0.016 ( 0.009 ) ∗ -0.015 ( 0.012 ) -0.014 ( 0.012 )
WLS (with controls) -0.012 ( 0.008 ) -0.017 ( 0.009 ) ∗ -0.009 ( 0.015 ) -0.008 ( 0.015 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 2259 2240 2259 2240
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,
female education, male education, employment status of the female,
Table 15: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the extensive margin - broad deﬁnition
Credit constraints: strict deﬁnition
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence -0.022 ( 0.011 ) ∗ -0.02 ( 0.012 ) ∗ -0.022 ( 0.011 ) ∗ -0.02 ( 0.012 ) ∗
OLS (with controls) -0.021 ( 0.012 ) ∗ -0.021 ( 0.012 ) ∗ -0.021 ( 0.012 ) ∗ -0.021 ( 0.012 ) ∗
Oaxaca Blinder -0.03 ( 0.014 ) ∗∗ -0.029 ( 0.015 ) ∗∗ -0.018 ( 0.013 ) -0.017 ( 0.013 )
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -0.022 ( 0.015 ) -0.023 ( 0.015 ) -0.015 ( 0.013 ) -0.016 ( 0.013 )
Kernel (bs) -0.022 ( 0.014 ) -0.023 ( 0.015 ) -0.015 ( 0.014 ) -0.016 ( 0.015 )
Mahalanobis (ana) -0.016 ( 0.022 ) -0.024 ( 0.018 ) -0.031 ( 0.02 ) -0.043 ( 0.017 ) ∗∗
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -0.015 ( 0.015 ) -0.024 ( 0.017 ) -0.01 ( 0.016 ) -0.02 ( 0.015 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -0.024 ( 0.011 ) ∗∗ -0.027 ( 0.011 ) ∗∗ -0.021 ( 0.015 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
WLS (with controls) -0.028 ( 0.011 ) ∗∗ -0.03 ( 0.011 ) ∗∗∗ -0.022 ( 0.019 ) -0.027 ( 0.02 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 2348 2321 2348 2321
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,









































1Table 16: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin : debt
Debt
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence -5248 ( 3761 ) -2655 ( 3615 ) -5248 ( 3761 ) -2655 ( 3615 )
OLS (with controls) -5241 ( 2748 ) ∗ -5513 ( 2013 ) ∗∗∗ -5241 ( 2748 ) ∗ -5513 ( 2013 ) ∗∗∗
Oaxaca Blinder -1971 ( 3419 ) -4116 ( 2725 ) -5860 ( 3517 ) ∗ -5757 ( 2502 ) ∗∗
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -7122 ( 4597 ) -5863 ( 4465 ) -6375 ( 4468 ) -3774 ( 4220 )
Kernel (bs) -7122 ( 4117 ) ∗ -5863 ( 3837 ) -6375 ( 4353 ) -3774 ( 4374 )
Mahalanobis (ana) -3447 ( 5440 ) 987 ( 5335 ) -5543 ( 5770 ) -529 ( 4887 )
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -8286 ( 0.015 ) -6761 ( 5726 ) -7564 ( 4881 ) -5939 ( 4255 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -6840 ( 3326 ) ∗∗ -9895 ( 3637 ) ∗∗∗ -3373 ( 6775 ) -90 ( 6784 )
WLS (with controls) -2422 ( 2334 ) -4891 ( 1559 ) ∗∗∗ -5216 ( 5142 ) -5474 ( 3678 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 360 366 360 366
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,
female education, male education, employment status of the female, total cost, value of the downpayment, % of downpayment
Table 17: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin : value of debt in annual
income
Value of the debt expressed in annual income
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence -0.163 ( 0.088 ) ∗ -0.174 ( 0.088 ) ∗∗ -0.163 ( 0.088 ) ∗ -0.174 ( 0.088 ) ∗∗
OLS (with controls) -0.182 ( 0.078 ) ∗∗ -0.189 ( 0.076 ) ∗∗ -0.182 ( 0.078 ) ∗∗ -0.189 ( 0.076 ) ∗∗
Oaxaca Blinder -0.053 ( 0.115 ) -0.142 ( 0.115 ) -0.213 ( 0.113 ) ∗ -0.196 ( 0.104 ) ∗
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -0.095 ( 0.105 ) -0.133 ( 0.117 ) -0.134 ( 0.106 ) -0.195 ( 0.111 ) ∗
Kernel (bs) -0.095 ( 0.089 ) -0.133 ( 0.09 ) -0.134 ( 0.118 ) -0.195 ( 0.114 ) ∗
Mahalanobis (ana) -0.009 ( 0.122 ) 0.014 ( 0.108 ) -0.097 ( 0.128 ) -0.229 ( 0.125 ) ∗
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -0.078 ( 0.015 ) -0.201 ( 0.104 ) ∗ -0.172 ( 0.113 ) -0.188 ( 0.12 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -0.027 ( 0.068 ) -0.125 ( 0.071 ) ∗ -0.127 ( 0.149 ) -0.148 ( 0.143 )
WLS (with controls) -0.08 ( 0.057 ) -0.177 ( 0.06 ) ∗∗∗ -0.183 ( 0.127 ) -0.194 ( 0.128 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 360 366 360 366
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,









































1Table 18: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin : value of the downpayment
Value of the downpayment
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence -4107 ( 3559 ) -4196 ( 3534 ) -4107 ( 3559 ) -4196 ( 3534 )
OLS (with controls) -4086 ( 2734 ) -4473 ( 2418 ) ∗ -4086 ( 2734 ) -4473 ( 2418 ) ∗
Oaxaca Blinder -5044 ( 4588 ) -3814 ( 3416 ) -3658 ( 4373 ) -3857 ( 3517 )
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -5437 ( 5510 ) -6645 ( 5277 ) -4639 ( 5026 ) -3891 ( 4960 )
Kernel (bs) -5437 ( 5428 ) -6645 ( 4661 ) -4639 ( 5471 ) -3891 ( 5068 )
Mahalanobis (ana) -4221 ( 6617 ) -254 ( 4363 ) -456 ( 6602 ) -7834 ( 5287 )
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -5332 ( 0.015 ) -4952 ( 5238 ) -4146 ( 5188 ) -4857 ( 5070 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -7269 ( 3682 ) ∗∗ -9783 ( 4021 ) ∗∗ -5790 ( 5733 ) -5642 ( 5510 )
WLS (with controls) -5188 ( 2503 ) ∗∗ -4910 ( 2352 ) ∗∗ -3521 ( 4187 ) -4016 ( 3510 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 361 359 361 359
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,
female education, male education, employment status of the female, total cost, value of the debt, % of downpayment
Table 19: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin : % of downpayment
% of the downpayment
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence -0.006 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.019 ) -0.006 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.019 )
OLS (with controls) 0.001 ( 0.013 ) 0.014 ( 0.009 ) ∗ 0.001 ( 0.013 ) 0.014 ( 0.009 ) ∗
Oaxaca Blinder 0.001 ( 0.014 ) 0.003 ( 0.012 ) 0.002 ( 0.014 ) 0.019 ( 0.017 )
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -0.002 ( 0.022 ) 0.006 ( 0.019 ) -0.003 ( 0.02 ) -0.003 ( 0.02 )
Kernel (bs) -0.002 ( 0.019 ) 0.006 ( 0.015 ) -0.003 ( 0.02 ) -0.003 ( 0.019 )
Mahalanobis (ana) -0.006 ( 0.025 ) 0.012 ( 0.025 ) -0.014 ( 0.026 ) -0.012 ( 0.025 )
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -0.004 ( 0.015 ) 0.014 ( 0.019 ) 0 ( 0.022 ) -0.015 ( 0.022 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -0.016 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.016 ) -0.02 ( 0.036 ) -0.021 ( 0.033 )
WLS (with controls) -0.001 ( 0.011 ) 0.01 ( 0.007 ) 0.004 ( 0.024 ) 0.017 ( 0.012 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 360 360 360 360
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,









































1Table 20: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin : total cost
total cost
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence 0.035 ( 0.024 ) 0.04 ( 0.024 ) ∗ 0.035 ( 0.024 ) 0.04 ( 0.024 ) ∗
OLS (with controls) 0.038 ( 0.021 ) ∗ 0.046 ( 0.021 ) ∗∗ 0.038 ( 0.021 ) ∗ 0.046 ( 0.021 ) ∗∗
Oaxaca Blinder 0.038 ( 0.025 ) 0.057 ( 0.022 ) ∗∗∗ 0.039 ( 0.024 ) 0.044 ( 0.022 ) ∗∗
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) 0.045 ( 0.027 ) ∗ 0.052 ( 0.026 ) ∗∗ 0.032 ( 0.025 ) 0.051 ( 0.025 ) ∗∗
Kernel (bs) 0.045 ( 0.026 ) ∗ 0.052 ( 0.022 ) ∗∗ 0.032 ( 0.026 ) 0.051 ( 0.025 ) ∗∗
Mahalanobis (ana) 0.065 ( 0.03 ) ∗∗ 0.075 ( 0.032 ) ∗∗ 0.047 ( 0.039 ) 0.058 ( 0.039 )
Nearest Neighbors (ana) 0.061 ( 0.015 ) ∗∗ 0.055 ( 0.026 ) ∗∗ 0.022 ( 0.026 ) 0.051 ( 0.026 ) ∗∗
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence 0.041 ( 0.018 ) ∗∗ 0.062 ( 0.018 ) ∗∗∗ 0.035 ( 0.043 ) 0.034 ( 0.044 )
WLS (with controls) 0.035 ( 0.017 ) ∗∗ 0.057 ( 0.016 ) ∗∗∗ 0.039 ( 0.039 ) 0.044 ( 0.04 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 362 367 362 367
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, annual income, number of kids,
female education, male education, employment status of the female, value of the debt, value of downpayment, % of dowpayment
Table 21: Impact of marriage on credit constraints at the intensive margin : annual income
Annual income
ATT ATU
Simple diﬀerence 114 ( 1219 ) 1310 ( 1158 ) 114 ( 1219 ) 1310 ( 1158 )
OLS (with controls) 715 ( 868 ) 1493 ( 601 ) ∗∗ 715 ( 868 ) 1493 ( 601 ) ∗∗
Oaxaca Blinder -286 ( 1301 ) 1085 ( 828 ) 996 ( 1216 ) 1694 ( 771 ) ∗∗
Matching estimators
Kernel (ana) -881 ( 1660 ) 373 ( 1451 ) 246 ( 1494 ) 1505 ( 1356 )
Kernel (bs) -881 ( 1409 ) 373 ( 1171 ) 246 ( 1591 ) 1505 ( 1460 )
Mahalanobis (ana) -471 ( 1763 ) 857 ( 1588 ) -113 ( 1688 ) 2381 ( 1638 )
Nearest Neighbors (ana) -899 ( 0.015 ) 1788 ( 1235 ) 761 ( 1604 ) 2126 ( 1391 )
HIR weights estimators
Simple diﬀerence -1042 ( 1130 ) 574 ( 1017 ) -404 ( 2044 ) 827 ( 1891 )
WLS (with controls) -51 ( 783 ) 1303 ( 480 ) ∗∗∗ 620 ( 1437 ) 1365 ( 1029 )
Covariates Discrete Continuous Discrete Continuous
N 360 367 360 367
Standard errors into parenthesis. Ana means that the analytical variance is computed, bs means that the variance is estimated
by bootstrap. Bootstrap variances: 250 replicates. Covariates include: male age, female age, number of kids, female education,
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Figure 6: Comparison of weights - credit constraints at the intensive margin - Treatment=married
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